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ABSTRACT 
For the first time in the American legal profession, non-lawyers can 
openly, independently, ethically, and legally engage in activities 
recognized by bar associations as the practice of law. In 2012, the 
Washington Supreme Court passed Admission and Practice Rule 28 (APR 
28), establishing the profession’s first paraprofessional licensing scheme 
that allows non-lawyers to give legal advice. The process authorizes 
qualified non-lawyers to provide legal advice without the supervision of a 
lawyer. Washington’s Supreme Court intends for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, or “LLLTs” as they are known, to increase access to justice 
by responding to the unmet civil legal needs of Washington residents, 
mirroring a broader call in the legal profession for service delivery models 
that triage the simpler cases from the complex. Doing so, the LLLT model 
aims to better meet the needs of those who cannot otherwise afford 
professional legal help. 
Will the LLLT model increase access to justice? That depends on 
how we define “justice”—more specifically, justice for whom? LLLTs 
have prompted anticipation that the model will do its part to close the gap 
on the unmet civil legal assistance needs of low- and moderate-income 
populations, a need perhaps best shown by Washington State’s Civil Legal 
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Needs studies. Yet to fully understand the model and its potential, we must 
look more closely at who will benefit from it and, critically, who will not. 
This Article finds that the LLLT model is not designed to increase 
access to justice for those from low-income populations. This conclusion 
is based on first-hand interviews with the architects of the model as well 
as on original surveys and interviews conducted with the first two cohorts 
of LLLTs and LLLT Candidates. LLLTs and Candidates expect to keep 
their pricing schemes high enough to bring in a sustainable revenue 
stream, intend to work primarily through traditional legal service delivery 
models at law firms and as solo practitioners, and overall do not report 
highly salient motivation to target low-income clientele relative to their 
other motivations for becoming an LLLT. From all of this, we do not have 
reason to believe that low-income legal consumers will better access 
justice through the current LLLT model. 
This Article first sets forth the context for why and how to weigh 
whether the model will increase access to justice for low-income 
populations, and then analyzes why, based on LLLTs’ and Candidates’ 
responses, we do not have reason to believe that the model will expand 
access to justice in an appreciable way for low-income consumers. The 
Article then contemplates the implications of this finding, which 
Washington and other states may wish to consider as they develop legal 
paraprofessional licensing schemes like the LLLT model and, ultimately, 
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A. The Development of the LLLT Model 
Americans across the country struggle to afford legal assistance.1 
Our adversarial legal system assumes that parties who participate can 
engage legal counsel as needed, but that is not reality.2 The legal 
                                                     
 1. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004); REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. 
SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING 
PROJECT 2–4, 9 (2011); Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 
205, 20506, 221 (“Our country has a vexing access-to-justice crisis. Nobody denies this.”); Vision 
and Mission, A2JLAB, http://a2jlab.org/vision-and-mission/ [https://perma.cc/XDJ5-CSBV] (citing 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-Full 
Report.pdf). 
 2. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 14 (“In most discussions, ‘equal justice’ implies equal access to 
the justice system. The underlying assumption is that social justice is available through procedural 
justice. But that, of course, is a dubious proposition. Those who receive their ‘day in court’ do not 
always feel that ‘justice has been done,’ and with reason. . . . Even those who win in court can lose in 
life. Formal rights can be prohibitively expensive to enforce, successful plaintiffs can be informally 
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profession has not achieved a comprehensive, sustainable solution to this 
challenge, which is commonly referred to as the “justice gap.”3 American 
lawyers remain largely cost prohibitive.4 Legal aid can only assist so many 
of those who need but cannot afford legal assistance.5 Civil Gideon—the 
concept of a legal right to a lawyer in civil cases—remains a quixotic call 
for the foreseeable future.6 Pro bono legal assistance from private law 
firms or practitioners only goes so far,7 while challenges to its expansion 
                                                     
blacklisted, and legislatures may overturn legal rulings that lack political support.”); RICHARD ZORZA, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND 
UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS 11–12 (May 2002), http://www.zorza.net/Res_ProSe_ 
SelfHelpCtPub.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6CM-U5PB] (“While our entire intellectual, jurisprudential, 
and even physical model of courts is built around the assumption that every litigant has a lawyer 
literally standing beside him or her, the reality is that in many courts, many or almost all of the cases 
do not fit that model. Rather one, or frequently both parties, stands alone.”). 
 3. See generally RHODE, supra note 1; SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 1; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS 9 (2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
marketresearch/PublicDocuments/JusticeGaInAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4LN7-8HC3]. The “justice gap” is commonly understood to include the unmet civil legal needs of 
low-income populations, though it has also been used to describe the gap in available affordable legal 
services for moderate-income populations. See, e.g., Gene Johnson, Washington Experiments with 
More Affordable Legal Advice, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 27, 2015, 4:55 PM), https://www.seattletimes. 
com/seattle-news/washington-experiments-with-more-affordable-legal-advice/ (quoting Deborah 
Rhode’s comment on the “crucial need” for models to close the justice gap, noting “over four-fifths 
of the legal needs of poor people and close to one-half of the needs of moderate income people are not 
being met”). 
 4. See generally RHODE, supra note 1; Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 129 (2010); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and 
Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949 (2009); Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of 
Testimony: Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in New York, RICHARD ZORZA’S 
ACCESS TO JUST. BLOG, https://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/hadfield-testimony-
october-2012-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NBL-B5H4] [hereinafter Hadfield Testimony]. 
 5. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3, at 12 (“[F]or every client served by an LSC-funded 
program, at least one eligible person seeking help will be turned down due to limited resources.”) 
(emphasis omitted); RHODE, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 6. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness 
in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 354–62 (1978) (expressing skepticism that resources 
could sufficiently increase to provide legal services to everyone to the same extent enjoyed by the 
affluent); Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for Improving 
Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2227 (2013); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer 
and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2209–10 (2012); see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 
431 (2011) (holding that a father facing imprisonment for contempt of court after failure to pay child 
support was not entitled to counsel); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that 
an indigent parent does not have a right to counsel in a custody case based on the Eldridge factors). 
But see RHODE, supra note 1, at 113 (“Establishing a similar [Gideon] entitlement for at least some 
categories of civil matters should remain a priority.”). 
 7. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 16–17, 145; Hadfield, supra note 4, at 156; Sandefur, supra note 
4, at 966; Hadfield Testimony, supra note 4. 
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remain.8 Courthouse help desks may (or may not) assist pro se litigants in 
filing the right form or “finding the bathroom,” but the need for their staff 
to remain neutral to the parties in a dispute restricts their ability to give 
case-specific advice and thus their helpfulness.9 Special advocates who are 
not trained in law may help litigants navigate the nuts and bolts of the legal 
system or accompany clients to court, but they cannot advise on how the 
law will play out and, accordingly, how a client should proceed.10 Even 
more sweeping deregulatory efforts that would allow non-lawyers to own 
and share in the profits of legal service efforts do not ensure that low- and 
moderate-income populations will gain greater access to the courts.11 
The State of Washington is no different. As established in 
Washington’s 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study, a key initiative to collect 
insights from more than 1,000 low- and moderate-income Washington 
households, the state’s low-income population faces more than 85% of 
their legal needs without an attorney.12 An updated version of the study in 
2015 focused on lower-income households and shows that the challenge 
continues; more than three-quarters of those households with a civil legal 
matter either did not seek or were not able to obtain legal help.13 Every 
                                                     
 8. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 6, at 2209 (“Despite the best and continuing efforts of 
the civil Gideon and access to justice movements, and the need for greater funding for legal services 
provision, it may be time to face the fact that there will never be enough funding to provide a full 
attorney-client relationship with a competent lawyer to all low-income persons interacting with, or 
contemplating interaction with, the legal system.”). See generally Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. 
Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We Know—and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 109–11 (2013) (noting that “there is reason to be concerned that the well 
of pro bono resources will shrink” where corporate clients push to aggressively minimize costs). 
 9. RHODE, supra note 1, at 83. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, 
Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 15 (2016) (arguing that non-lawyer 
ownership is likely to be quite different than conventional wisdom suggests in part because “there is 
reason to doubt that these changes will lead to significantly more access to legal services for poor and 
moderate income populations”). 
 12. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING, WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT, THE 
WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 8, 25 (2003) [hereinafter CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 
STUDY 2003], http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/taskforce/civillegalneeds.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/J2S7-Y67E]. 
 13. SOC. & ECON. SCIS. RESEARCH CTR., WASH. STATE UNIV., WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT, 
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY UPDATE JUNE 2015 2, 45 (2015) [hereinafter CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 
2015], http://ocla.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CLNS14-Executive-Report-05-28-2015-
FINAL1.pdf [http://perma.cc/B343-EXKG]. It is important to note that the two studies differ in their 
definitions of low-income household. The 2003 study defines low-income households as those living 
at or below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), with a separate category defined for low-
moderate income (125–200% FPL) and high-moderate income (200–400% FPL) individuals and 
households. CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2003, supra note 12, at 19. However, the 2015 study defines 
low-income as those living below 200% of the FPL, distinguishing between those who are “low 
income” (125–200% FPL) and “very low income” (under 125% FPL). CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 
2015, supra note 13, at 6, 11. 
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day, Washington courts handle thousands of pro se litigants.14 In family 
law in particular, courts saw a spike in pro se litigants in the 1970s when 
divorce rates began to rise, leading many family law cases to have at least 
one self-represented litigant.15 The pro se trend persists.16 Litigants today 
often represent themselves, sometimes leaning on websites or other 
sources for unauthorized legal advice,17 much to the chagrin of legal 
professionals and possibly to the detriment of the pro se parties 
themselves.18 
Attorneys and judges in Washington took note.19 Decades of 
evidence on this issue along with years of debate about the right solution 
ultimately spurred the Washington Supreme Court to pass Admission and 
Practice Rule 28 (APR 28) in 2012, creating a whole new category of legal 
service provider: Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs).20 The rule 
sets forth a framework to regulate, license, and authorize non-lawyers to 
practice law in certain contexts. In doing so, Washington became the first 
state in the nation to allow non-lawyers to openly, independently, 
ethically, and legally engage in activities recognized by bar associations 
as the practice of law21albeit on a limited basis. 
                                                     
 14. Order in the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited 
License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, 4 (Wash. 2013) [hereinafter Order for APR 28]. 
 15. Barbara Madsen & Stephen Crossland, The Limited License Legal Technician: Making 
Justice More Accessible, NW LAW., Apr.–May 2013, at 23, 23–24 (discussing how the WSBA 
established committees to address the rise in the unauthorized practice of law, which was “dramatically 
true in family law cases where courts in the 1970s began reporting large increases in family law cases 
involving at least one party not represented by an attorney”). The LLLT model assumes that pro se 
litigants generally have a moderate or low income, though more data would be useful to support this 
assumption. 
 16. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 960 (2000). 
 17. Madsen & Crossland, supra note 15, at 24. 
 18. See WASH. CT. GR 25(a) (stating that the purpose of the WSBA includes “enforc[ing] rules 
prohibiting individuals and organizations from engaging in unauthorized legal and law-related services 
that pose a threat to the general public”). But see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 6, at 2118 
(presenting empirical evidence that gives reason to question whether the presence of a legal aid lawyer 
actually helps a client win, when the client selection process may bias selection in favor of easier cases 
that are likely to win regardless of legal assistance). 
 19. Earlier literature comprehensively covers both the history of the development of the LLLT 
model and the evolution of access to justice solutions. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, The Washington 
State Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. 
L.J. SUPRA 75, 78–91 (2013) (outlining the access to justice crisis in the United States); see also Order 
for APR 28, supra note 14, at 46. See generally RHODE, supra note 1. 
 20. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28 (2012) [hereinafter APR 28]. 
 21. See Stephen R. Crossland & Paula C. Littlewood, The Washington State Limited License 
Legal Technician Program: Enhancing Access to Justice and Ensuring the Integrity of the Legal 
Profession, 65 S.C. L. REV. 611, 612 (2014). The architects of the model do not prefer the term “non-
lawyer” since the term can be construed as separating, othering, and downplaying the roles served in 
the legal profession by those who are not attorneys. Moreover, the term emphasizes what LLLTs are 
not, rather than what they are: licensed professionals. Short of finding a substitute term that can clearly 
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APR 28 pursues two objectives: inhibit the unauthorized practice of 
law and increase access to justice.22 Practically, APR 28 allows LLLTs to 
ask their clients about relevant facts,23 draft and review documents,24 
inform clients about procedures and deadlines,25 and most significantly, 
advise clients on the law.26 Because their licensing requirements allow for 
more limited training than law schools, at least in some respects, 
Washington authorizes LLLTs to provide advice and services in a more 
limited scope than licensed attorneys. For instance, LLLTs cannot 
represent clients in court or negotiate with opposing counsel.27 In fact, 
their clients are still considered pro se.28 For any issues or services not 
within their scope, LLLTs must refer their clients to a lawyer.29 Because 
of LLLTs’ limited training and scope, the Washington Supreme Court and 
Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) expect that legal technicians 
will be able to advise on more routine cases at a lower cost than lawyers, 
thus expanding access to legal assistance for pro se litigants who would 
                                                     
and efficiently communicate the significance of the development to have people who are not lawyers 
getting licensed as professionals in the field, this Article uses the term “non-lawyer” and welcomes 
suggestions on a new term that can encompass all of these considerations. 
 22. Steve Crossland, Restore Access to Justice Through Limited License Legal Technicians, 
GPSOLO, May/June 2014, at 56, 58 (“The driving principles of the program are to meet the unmet need 
for access to the legal system and to do so in a manner that will serve and not harm the public.”). 
 23. APR 28(F)(1). 
 24. APR 28(F)(5)–(7). 
 25. APR 28(F)(2)–(3). 
 26. APR 28(F)(6)–(8). 
 27. See APR 28(H)(5)–(6). This could change. The LLLT Board has proposed amendments to 
APR 28. See Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., Draft Suggested Amendments to APR 28, WASH. ST. 
B. ASS’N (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/licensing/lllt/draft_apr_28.pdf? 
sfvrsn=e93bf1_0 [https://perma.cc/42UC-L7UZ] [hereinafter Draft Suggested Amendments, APR 28]. 
These proposed amendments, pending comments from the public, would allow LLLTs to 
“[c]ommunicate and negotiate with the opposing party or the party’s representative regarding 
procedural matters, such as setting court hearings or other ministerial or civil procedure matters” and 
“[n]egotiate the client’s legal rights or responsibilities provided that the client has given written 
consent defining the parameters.” Draft Suggested Amendments, APR 28(F)(12)–(13). Under the 
proposed amendments, LLLTs would also be able to accompany, assist, and confer with their clients 
at depositions, “present to a court agreed orders, uncontested orders, default orders and accompanying 
documents,” and “assist and confer with their pro se clients and respond to questions from the court 
or tribunal” under certain circumstances. Draft Suggested Amendments, APR 28 REG 2(B)(2)(f)–(h). 
The LLLT Board unanimously approved the updated suggested amendments to APR 28, but they are 
yet to be approved by the Washington Supreme Court as of this publication. See LLLT Board, Meeting 
Minutes, WSBA (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legalcommunity/ 
committees/lllt-board/2017-08-17-meeting-minutes---approved.pdf?sfvrsn=f2973bf1_0 [https:// 
perma.cc/43SH-XSCV]; LLLT Board, Meeting Minutes, WSBA (July 9, 2018), https://www.wsba. 
org/Legal-Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/LLLT-board [https://perma.cc/G4QY-
Y96M]. 
 28. See Holland, supra note 19, at 105 (citing Letter from Mark Johnson, WSBA President, to 
Wash. State Supreme Court 1 (Sept. 26, 2008)). 
 29. APR 28(G)(4). 
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have sought legal advice but for the price tag.30 The model offers a bold 
experiment to expand access to justice, and its champions acknowledge it 
as just that—an experiment.31 
The model will eventually expand the legal issues on which LLLTs 
can work. The first cohorts will be authorized to work in family law,32 
including cases involving domestic violence,33 because family law 
comprises a substantial proportion of unmet civil legal needs. The Legal 
Services Corporation has consistently found that one-third of all cases 
closed by their grantees deal with family law,34 and the LLLT model 
started with family law because the courts see so many pro se litigants in 
this area.35 The model has been designed to expand to other issues in the 
                                                     
 30. See Madsen & Crossland, supra note 15, at 24 (“If the law has become so complex that legal 
training is required just to fill out a form, where is the space for the little person who needs a simple 
divorce? There’s a huge need for elementary legal advice and we’re not meeting it.”); Crossland & 
Littlewood, supra note 21, at 613 (“One of the supreme court’s mandates to the [Practice of Law 
Board] for GR 25 was ‘to address access-to-justice issues for those who cannot afford attorneys’ by 
recommended ways to authorize nonlawyers to engage in certain defined activities that would 
otherwise constitute the practice of law . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 31. Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”? Implications 
for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C. L. REV. 579, 588–89 (2014) (“Washington bar officials 
acknowledge the uncertain business model for LLLTs. . . . While opponents worry that LLLTs will 
take solo and small firm lawyers’ business, proponents worry that LLLTs may have a hard time 
making a living. . . . Although there is no shortage of unmet legal need in Washington, or elsewhere, 
it is unclear how private paraprofessional practice aimed at the back-end legal needs of low- and 
middle-income consumers will be any more viable than private law practice in that market . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Order for APR 28, supra note 14, at 8 (wherein the Washington 
State Supreme Court admits that, upon adopting APR 28, they cannot foresee what will come of the 
LLLT model as “[n]o one has a crystal ball”).  
 32. APR 28 REG. 2(B); Holland, supra note 19, at 99 n.113 (citing Letter from Practice of Law 
Board to Wash. State Supreme Court 2 (Jan. 7, 2008)). The Rule started by authorizing LLLTs to 
advise on family actions for better or for worse. The great need for legal assistance in family law 
matters exists in tension with concern from the WSBA Family Law Section Executive Committee and 
family law attorneys more generally, who point out that this “is one of the most challenging areas of 
legal practice” and that “[c]ontrary to the misperception of some, family law is quite complex.” Jean 
Cotton, Legal Technicians Aren’t the Answer: The Family Law Section’s Executive Committee Weighs 
In, WASH. STATE B. NEWS, July 2008, at 30, 31. And the stakes are high. Should LLLTs err, potential 
problematic outcomes include loss of custody or contact with one’s children, or misidentification of 
fathers, for example. Id. 
 33. See APR 28 REG. 2. 
 34. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2016 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2016), 
https://www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2016-annual-report [https://perma.cc/KQB3-Z65L]; 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2015 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2015), https:// 
www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2015-annual-report [https://perma.cc/T2NE-87MM]; LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP., 2014 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NUMBERS: THE DATA UNDERLYING 
LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 14 (2014), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/LSC2014 
FactBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK5H-9E5Y]. 
 35. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 616; WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, LEGAL 
TECHNICIAN FAQS, http://perma.cc/P4A9-AM35 [hereinafter WSBA FAQS]; see also Hadfield, 
supra note 16, at 960 (in 1990, 88% of litigated family law cases in the U.S. had at least one party 
who arrived unrepresented or defaulted); Telephone Interview with Stephen Crossland, Chair, LLLT 
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future, including landlord–tenant and elder law, since these areas also see 
a lot of pro se litigants.36 
Before APR 28 came along, courts and advocates had developed 
other non-lawyer models, including special advocates37 and courthouse 
clerks,38 who could provide information and support but not legal advice 
per se. Washington has Limited Practice Officers who select and prepare 
documents to close real estate deals.39 Washington also has a Moderate 
Means Program (MMP) where parties who fall between 200% and 400% 
of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) can connect with attorneys who agree 
to provide reduced-fee services.40 
Meanwhile, the WSBA initiated efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to 
figure out what to do about the growing number of pro se litigants and the 
corresponding trend of non-lawyers offering legal help, particularly in 
family law.41 To better regulate non-lawyers engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law, the WSBA created the Committee to Define the Practice 
of Law, which led to the Washington Supreme Court issuing General 
Court Rules 24 (GR 24) and 25 (GR 25) to define the practice of law and 
establish the state’s Practice of Law Board (POLB), respectively.42 The 
Washington Supreme Court mandated the POLB “to address access-to-
justice issues for those who cannot afford attorneys by recommending 
ways to authorize nonlawyers” to practice law in certain ways as defined 
by GR 24, which in time led to the creation of APR 28 and the LLLT 
licensing scheme.43 
LLLTs offer a tangible opportunity for practitioners and legal 
scholars to test a potential solution that has garnered much discussion: 
embracing non-lawyers as a means to close the justice gap.44 The model 
                                                     
Bd., & Paula Littlewood, Exec. Dir., Wash. State Bar Ass’n (Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with 
Crossland & Littlewood]. 
 36. WSBA FAQS, supra note 35; see also Holland, supra note 19, at 99 n.113 (citing Letter from 
POLB to Wash. State Supreme Court 2 (Jan. 7, 2008)); Interview with Crossland & Littlewood, supra 
note 35. 
 37. See, e.g., Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Exploration for 
Family Peace, 33 FAM. L.Q. 719, 733, 738 (1999) (speaking to the potential usefulness of properly 
trained Court-Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs)). 
 38. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 83. 
 39. Holland, supra note 19, at 90 n.65. 
 40. See Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Moderate Means Program (May 10, 2018), https://www.wsba. 
org/connect-serve/volunteer-opportunities/mmp [https://perma.cc/EVC4-QDQY]. 
 41. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 612–13. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 613. 
 44. See, e.g., JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL 
AMERICANS, BELLOW-SACKS ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT 3 (2005), http:// 
www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/bellow-sacks.pdf [https://perma.cc/28AE-8ZGR] (calling for 
holistic reform with a spectrum of available tools in order to provide full access to legal services, 
including “expanded paralegal practice with appropriate quality assurances and consumer protections” 
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for law draws inspiration from the much acclaimed but difficult-to-
document success of the nurse practitioner model in medicine.45 However, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, legal paraprofessionals have faced flak alongside 
fanfare.46 Almost half a century ago, the New York Times reported on the 
debate regarding paralawyers, which featured professional-caste-system 
tensions: who benefits from the training and the services?47 Similar 
questions surround the model today. Will LLLTs undercut lawyers’ 
market share? Will they fail to provide competent legal services? Or will 
their inherently limited scope stifle their value?48 
B. The Purposes of the LLLT Model 
Out of these questions and developments, in 2005 the POLB drafted 
a rule to create the LLLT model.49 The model’s twin aims reflect the 
debates leading up to the passage of APR 28. The rule grew out of decades 
of discussions about the creation of paraprofessional models for the state.50 
                                                     
in place); RHODE, supra note 1, at 15, 89–91 (writing that “almost all of the scholarly experts and 
commissions” that have studied paraprofessional models for law have recommended them); Richard 
Zorza, Other Voices: Making an International Case, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. EQUAL JUSTICE 54 (2003) 
(internal quotation omitted) (noting an evolving, multinational “consensus favoring a complex mixed 
model” of legal services delivery, including non-lawyer advocates); Chambliss, supra note 31, at 579 
(“The idea of training paraprofessionals to perform simple legal tasks has attracted great interest in 
recent years among reform-minded lawyers.”); Charn, supra note 6, at 2231 (noting that “advice” and 
“lay advocates” can play a role in increasing access, in addition to lawyers); Cooper, supra note 1, at 
21721 (“As with the other efforts to improve access to justice without the use of lawyers, 
Washington’s novel plan deserves a chance.”); Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential 
Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 47 (2013) (noting 
advice from non-lawyers as part of an essential strategy to provide legal assistance, short of full 
representation by counsel); Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and 
Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 765, 783–89 (2003) (finding that non-lawyers 
may outperform lawyers, particularly if they specialize); Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of 
Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 5152, 110 (2015) (“[T]he LLLT program is well worth 
considering.”); Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri, & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, 
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 60 (2012) (“Where court procedures cannot be simplified and self-help is 
inadequate, lay advocacy or limited-scope representation by lawyers is prescribed.”); see also Julian 
Aprile, Comment, Limited License Legal Technicians: Non-lawyers Get Access to the Legal 
Profession, But Clients Won’t Get Access to Justice, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 217, 22021 n.28 (2016) 
(compiling sources who “seem to support the creation of practitioners like LLLTs”). 
 45. Madsen & Crossland, supra note 15. 
 46. For the history of the development of the LLLT model, see Holland, supra note 19, at 91–
111. 
 47. To be clear, the article discusses the proposal of the idea to train paralawyers, not a model 
that had been developed. See Fred P. Graham, Educators Fear Paralawyer Proposal, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 31, 1971) https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/31/archives/educators-fear-paralawyer-proposal. 
html.  
 48. See Richard Granat, Limited Licensing of Legal Technicians: A Good Idea?, ELAWYERING 
BLOG, http://perma.cc/C5XF-FEFL. See generally Aprile, supra note 44. 
 49. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 612–13. 
 50. Id.; Holland, supra note 19, at 94. 
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The rule passed in 2012, seven years after it was first drafted, naturally 
involving compromises along the way.51 According to some of its main 
architects, the LLLT model seeks to “address the staggering unmet civil 
legal needs of the public in Washington” and “to curb, if not eliminate, the 
burgeoning prevalence of people providing purported legal services 
without any requisite training or regulatory oversight.”52 Like the rest of 
the country, some of the biggest hurdles to creating paraprofessional 
models in Washington came from the WSBA, whose job entails, in part, 
safeguarding the sanctity of the profession in order to protect the public 
from the risks of the unauthorized practice of law.53 
LLLT skeptics point out the Bar’s interest in protecting business for 
lawyers, which paraprofessionals could threaten.54 Perhaps because of 
this, the order issuing APR 28 assures that LLLTs are “unlikely to have 
any appreciable impact on attorney practice.”55 By incorporating the goal 
to stem the tide of unauthorized practice of law, APR 28 heads off the 
Bar’s argument by aligning the rule’s interest with theirs.56 APR 28’s 
advocates have essentially argued, “If you can’t beat them, join them.” 
The steady rise of unauthorized practice has shown that litigants will seek 
alternative means to obtain legal assistance with or without the Bar. As 
such, the Bar could try to maintain influence and control quality by 
engaging in the process to determine a licensing scheme for non-lawyers 
rather than eschewing the tide and missing out on the conversation 
altogether.57 The origins of the model, the scheme’s rigorous 
                                                     
 51. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 612. 
 52. Id.; see Order for APR 28, supra note 14, at 2. 
 53. Hadfield, supra note 4, at 154; Holland, supra note 19, at 89. 
 54. Holland, supra note 19, at 89; see also RHODE, supra note 1, at 83; Chambliss, supra note 
31, at 581–83. 
 55. Order for APR 28, supra note 14, at 8. To this point, Steve Crossland, one of the main 
architects of the model, notes: “If [this] segment of the market were being served by our profession, 
we wouldn’t be having this discussion.” Crossland, supra note 22, at 58. 
 56. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 613; Holland, supra note 19, at 91–92, 94. 
 57. Chambliss, supra note 31, at 583 (stating that non-lawyer practice is “already widespread 
and expanding,” thus narrowing the Bar’s choice from whether to how to regulate non-lawyer 
practice); Holland, supra note 19, at 113 (quoting Chief Justice Barbara Madsen’s rationale for 
adopting APR 28: “In adopting this rule we are acutely aware of the unregulated activities of many 
untrained, unsupervised legal practitioners who daily do harm to ‘clients’ and to the public’s interest 
in having high quality civil legal services provided by qualified practitioners.”). Judges may have been 
further persuaded by the tide of litigants in their courts who had sought legal advice from unauthorized 
sources. Further, judges may have been persuaded at the prospect of easing docket congestion: pro se 
litigants may no longer come to court “unprepared” and “bewildered.” Crossland & Littlewood, supra 
note 21, at 614. Further, a 2014 report showed that, according to court surveys, unprepared pro se 
litigants slow down court functions and, most critically, contribute to questionable justice outcomes. 
BARBARA A. MADSEN, WASH. COURTS, 2014 STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 5 (2014), https://www. 
ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Management/Interbranch-Relations/~/media/A9A804CD9F054 
D6E81FEA66D5609C524.ashx [https://perma.cc/B2WG-EA2P]. 
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qualifications, the training’s focus on the meaning of unauthorized 
practice, and the distinction between the scope of LLLTs’ and lawyers’ 
work58 suggest the significance, or even predominance, of the goal to stem 
unauthorized practice. At the same time, APR 28 seeks to increase access 
to justice. To the extent that this objective aspires to provide greater access 
to professional legal assistance for those who otherwise could not afford 
it, these twin aims exist in tension, emphasizing the need to clarify the kind 
of justice to which APR 28 aims to increase access.  
C. The Ambiguity of the Model’s Intent to Increase Access to Justice 
With the scheme up and running, we must ask: Who gains access to 
justice through LLLTs?  
APR 28, the rule giving rise to the LLLT model, says that it aims to 
increase access to justice but seeks plainly to “expand the affordability of 
quality legal assistance which protects the public interest.”59 APR 28 
neither defines justice nor explicitly identifies the populations it seeks to 
assist. The rule’s text does not state whether the LLLT licensing scheme 
intends to help low- or moderate-income populations, or both. 
However, the Washington Supreme Court starts off APR 28 with a 
statement of purpose. The court begins: “The Civil Legal Needs Study 
(2003), commissioned by the Supreme Court, clearly established that the 
legal needs of the consuming public are not currently being met.”60 The 
2003 Civil Legal Needs Study itself sets out “to conduct a study of the 
civil legal needs of Washington’s low-income and vulnerable 
populations.”61 The 2003 study looks at data not only from individuals and 
households who are “low income” (under 125% FPL), but also from those 
the study refers to as “low-moderate” (125%–200% FPL) and even those 
who are “high-moderate” (200%–400% FPL).62 However, the report’s key 
findings together suggest the crux of the study: low-income populations 
have a harder time accessing justice than those with a low-moderate or 
high-moderate income.63 As the architects of the model put it, “Several 
                                                     
 58. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 616–17. 
 59. APR 28(A). 
 60. APR 28(A). 
 61. CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2003, supra note 12, at 5. 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. Id. at 8, 23 (“More than three-quarters of all low-income households in Washington state 
experience at least one civil (not criminal) legal problem each year. In the aggregate, low-income 
people experience more than one million important civil legal problems annually.”); id. at 23, fig. 1 
(“Low-income households are more likely than moderate-income households to have many legal 
needs.”); id. at 25 (“Low-income people face more than 85 percent of their legal problems without 
help from an attorney. . . . [They] receive help from an attorney in connection with less than 10 percent 
of all civil legal issues.”); id. at 33 (“Most legal problems experienced by low-income people affect 
basic human needs, such as housing, family safety and security, and public safety.”); id. at 37 (“Legal 
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events and trends led the [Washington] supreme court to adopt the LLLT 
rule, including the groundbreaking 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study[,]” 
which “found that 85% of the state’s low-income population had serious 
civil legal problems involving basic need.”64 From these sources, we have 
reason to believe that when passing APR 28 the Washington Supreme 
Court contemplated that the LLLT model would seek at least in part to 
meet the unmet civil legal needs of the state’s low-income population. 
Further, early discussions have indicated that scholars, press, the 
model’s architects, and LLLTs and Candidates themselves have 
anticipated that the LLLT model would address the unmet civil legal needs 
of Washington’s low-income population, again, at least in part.65 
                                                     
problems experienced by low-income people are substantially more likely to relate to family safety 
(including domestic violence), economic security, housing and other basic needs.”); id. at 37, fig. 13 
(“Low-income households are more likely to experience family and housing related problems, while 
moderate-income households are more likely to experience problems related to employment and 
estates and trusts.”); id. at 38 (“Low-income households are more than four times as likely as high-
moderate-income households to experience issues relating to child support, and more than twice as 
likely to report domestic violence. Low-income households are also four times as likely to have issues 
relating to foster care, guardians, or child welfare authorities than their higher-income counterparts.”); 
id. at 47 (“Nearly half of all low-income people with a legal problem did not seek legal assistance 
because they did not know that there were laws to protect them or that relief could be obtained from 
the justice system.”); id. at 49 (“Nine out of 10 low-income people who do not get attorney assistance 
receive no help at all. The vast majority end up living with the consequences of the problem. Of the 
10 percent who try to get help elsewhere, most turn to organizations that cannot provide legal advice 
or assistance.”); id. at 51 (“Though widely divergent by region and demographic cluster group, nearly 
half of low-income households have access to and the capacity to use computers and the Internet. 
However, those with access to technology often do not know how it can help them address their legal 
needs.”); id. at 55 (“Low-income people who get legal assistance experience better outcomes and have 
greater respect for the justice system than those who do not.”). Other key findings focus on the issues 
experienced by women and minorities, including discrimination, and that legal problems and 
knowledge of legal resources do not differ significantly between rural and urban areas. See id. at 29, 
39, 43, 45. None of the study’s twelve key findings focus on the unmet civil legal needs of low-
moderate or high-moderate-income individuals and households. See id. at 8–9, 21, 23, 25, 29, 33, 37, 
39, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 55. The same could be inferred from the study’s design. While the study’s 
telephone survey sample included moderate-income people and its stakeholder survey asked about the 
perceptions of the civil legal needs of low- and moderate-income people, the study states that these 
surveys verified and provided comparisons and context for the field study data, which involved more 
than 1,300 individual in-depth surveys with low-income people only. See id. at 9–10. Together, the 
study’s findings and methods reveal its emphasis on the underserved civil legal needs of the state’s 
low-income populations. 
 64. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 614. 
 65. For examples, see the following sources discussing the aims of the legal technician model: 
Holland, supra note 19, at 75–77 (internal citations omitted) (“For years, the judiciary, bar 
associations, academics, and other observers have decried the lack of access to justice for poor and 
low-income individuals . . . . [I]n the near future, nonlawyers in Washington State may add 
substantially to the legal services available to poor and low-income persons.”); id. at 101 (“The POL 
Board . . . concluded that legal technicians would enhance access to justice . . . ‘for low income legal 
consumers . . . .’”); id. at 104 (citing Memorandum from WSBA Pro Bono & Legal Aid Comm. to 
WSBA President 2 (Aug. 1, 2008)) (“[T]he WSBA Pro Bono and Legal Aid Committee endorsed the 
2008 LLLT Rule ‘to assist low and moderate income family law litigantsmost of whom are currently 
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unrepresented . . . .’”); id. at 108 (quoting Letter from Stephen R. Crossland, Chair of the POLB, to 
Wash. State Supreme Court 1 (Apr. 2, 2009)) (“You will become leaders in the Nation and will provide 
the opportunity for much needed legal services for low income citizens of the State of Washington.”); 
id. at 112–13 (“In a majority opinion by Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, the supreme court explained 
and defended its adoption of APR 28: ‘. . . [W]e have also witnessed the wide and ever-growing gap 
in necessary and law related services for low and moderate income persons.’”). See also THOMAS M. 
CLARKE & REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, PUB. WELFARE FOUND., PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE 
WASHINGTON STATE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN PROGRAM 6 (March 2017), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/preliminary_evaluation_of_the_was
hington_state_limited_license_legal_technician_program_032117.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RSD-
SXSU] (“The stated objective of the LLLT program is to increase access to justice for low and 
moderate-income persons while protecting the public by ensuring the provision of quality legal 
services.”); Chambliss, supra note 31, at 581–82 (internal citations omitted) (writing that “the 
expansion of legal service delivery by nonlawyers is . . . probably desirable from the perspective of 
‘ordinary Americans’—low- and middle-income individuals and households with unmet legal 
needs”); id. at 588–89 (internal citations omitted) (“Although there is no shortage of unmet legal need 
in Washington, or elsewhere, it is unclear how private paraprofessional practice aimed at the back-end 
legal needs of low- and middle-income consumers will be any more viable than private law practice 
in that market—except possibly by lowering practitioners’ educational debt, enabling them to charge 
lower rates.”); id. at 600–02 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal 
Education and Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 531, 541 (2013)) (Low-income clients may not have 
enough information to select and regulate non-lawyer providers, and the “routine needs of low- and 
middle-income people” could be met by authorized non-lawyer practitioners who can provide 
effective, limited services with less expensive educational preparation.); Cooper, supra note 1, at 
21721 (considering how to solve the access to justice crisis for the poor and working class and saying 
the LLLT model “deserves a chance”); Aprile, supra note 44, at 218 (quoting Letter from Deborah M. 
Nelson, President, Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass’n, to the WSBA Bd. Of Governors (Dec. 7, 2006), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2009Jan/APR28/Erik%20Bjornson.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A2ER-JWN9] (stating that there are “no protections . . . to ensure that legal technicians will 
actually provide services to the poor”)). See also the following mentions in the popular press: Robert 
Ambrogi, Who Says You Need a Law Degree to Practice Law?, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/closing-the-justice-gap/2015/03/13/a5f576c8-c754-11e4-
aa1a-86135599fb0f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cda9382ebb28 [https://perma.cc/M6EM-
NKEN] (writing that the LLLT “is part of Washington state’s ambitious experiment to revolutionize 
access to legal services, particularly among the poor. In the United States, 80 to 90 percent of low-
income people with civil legal problems never receive help from a lawyer” and that the LLLT model, 
“if it spreads, could transform how middle- and lower-class Americans use the law”). See also the 
following materials from the model’s main architects: Order for APR 28, supra note 14, at 1, 4, 6, 11 
(considering the potential impact of the LLLT scheme not only on moderate-income but also low-
income individuals); Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 612–13 (internal citations omitted) 
(explaining that the POLB crafted the model to “meet those needs . . . revealed” by the 2003 Civil 
Legal Needs Study, specifically that “more than 85% of the poor and working poor did not have access 
to legal services to assist in addressing their civil legal needs”); Crossland, supra note 22, at 56, 58 
(writing that the Washington Supreme Court adopted the rule authorizing the LLLT licensing scheme 
because it was aware of the growing need to provide legal services to those not currently served by 
lawyers, as revealed in the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study, which showed that “not only the poor but 
lower-middle-income and middle-income families” could not access the legal system, and that the 
market for LLLTs “will likely be low- and moderate-income clients”); Steve Crossland, Paula 
Littlewood & Ellen Reed, Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) Program, WSBA (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/pro_bono_clearinghouse/ejc_2016_38.aut
hcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4R2-5CMR] (noting for the purpose of the LLLT model that “[a] 
Civil Legal Needs study conducted in 2003 confirmed that more than 80 percent of Washington’s low- 
and moderate-income populations experienced a legal need and went without help . . .”); Become a 
Legal Technician, WSBA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/join-the-
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Expectations exist that the LLLT model will help to increase access to 
justice for low-income people. 
At the same time, one of the model’s architects has stated that the 
LLLT model specifically targets moderate-income consumers, like a 
family of four who makes $98,000 per year—in other words, “not the 
poor.”66 Even the 2003 and 2015 Civil Legal Needs studies define “low 
income” differently from one another: the 2003 Study refers to those living 
at or below 125% of the FPL as “low income” with those living at 
125200% of the FPL deemed “low-moderate-income.” In contrast, the 
2015 Study groups together all of those living at or below 200% of the 
FPL as “low income,” delineating those living at or below 125% of the 
FPL as “very low income.”67 Given the emphasis by the Washington 
Supreme Court in the Order issuing APR 28 and by the model’s architects 
on the results of the 2003 Study as the justification for the LLLT model,68 
and the emphasis in the 2003 Study on the gap in justice for those living 
at or below 125% of the FPL, it is reasonable to say that those considered 
“low income” by the 2003 studythose living at or below 125% of the 
FPLwere contemplated by APR 28 as part of the target LLLT 
clientele.69 
With this understanding of access to justiceas a problem that 
includes low-income consumers living at or below 125% of the FPLthe 
below findings show that the LLLT model is not designed to increase 
access to justice in this sense. 
* * * 
This Article arrived at this understanding through original surveys 
and interviews conducted with LLLTs and LLLT Candidates to consider 
their anticipated pricing, intended service delivery models, and self-
reported motivations to see who will likely benefit from their services. Part 
I briefly introduces this method. Part II analyzes LLLTs’ and Candidates’ 
responses to discern who will use and benefit from LLLT services. This 
Article finds that LLLTs and Candidates expect to keep their pricing 
schemes high enough to bring in a sustainable revenue stream, intend to 
                                                     
legal-profession-in-wa/limited-license-legal-technicians/become-a-legal-technician 
[https://perma.cc/DE4K-6CT7] (“The Washington State Supreme Court directed the WSBA to 
develop and administer the LLLT license as part of the effort to make legal services more available 
for people with low or moderate income.”). See also the anticipations of LLLTs and LLLT Candidates 
themselves, infra fig.11. 
 66. Mary Juetten, When UPL Accusations Against Lawyer Paraprofessionals Are Just 
Protectionism, ABA J.: DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018, 8:30 AM) (citing WSBA Executive Director 
Paula Littlewood), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/protectionism_and_upl_versus_ 
paraprofessionals [https://perma.cc/PF6L-WKDW]. 
 67. See supra note 13 and discussion therein. 
 68. See supra notes 6064 and corresponding text. 
 69. See supra note 13 and discussion therein. 
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work primarily through traditional legal service delivery models at law 
firms and as solo practitioners, and overall do not report highly salient 
motivation to target low-income clientele relative to their other 
motivations for becoming an LLLT. In light of these insights, this Article 
concludes that the LLLT model as designed will not meaningfully increase 
access to justice for low-income populations. Part III considers the 
implications of this conclusion and contemplates how the model could be 
modified to increase access to justice across socioeconomic groups to 
further close the justice gap. 
The Article does not intend to criticize prematurely an experiment 
that has just begun in earnest. After all, even if the model can better 
provide access to affordable legal assistance solely for moderate-income 
populations, it will do its part to close the justice gap. Rather, the Article 
seeks to offer Washington and other states weighing the adoption of the 
LLLT modelincluding California, Oregon, and Utah70a nuanced 
understanding of what it might mean for LLLTs to increase access to 
justice, as well as factors and definitions to consider if these states intend 
as part of that goal to increase access to justice for low-income 
populations. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
This Article grounds its analysis in original primary research on the 
perspectives of those closest to the model: the LLLTs and LLLT 
Candidates who will carry it out on the front lines.71 A more detailed 
                                                     
 70. California, Oregon, and Utah are exploring adopting a version of the LLLT model. See 
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE LTD. LEGAL LICENSING, UTAH STATE COURTS, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/limited_legal/ 
Supreme%20Court%20Task%20Force%20to%20Examine%20Limited%20Legal%20Licensing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9G9-UQMH]; Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal 
Services to Promote Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1221 
(2016) (citing LEGAL TECHNICIANS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (Feb. 
13, 2015)); Chambliss, supra note 31, at 591–92. New York has also started a related but distinct pilot 
program to develop court “navigators.” See Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 70, at 1221 (citing 
JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2014: VISION 
AND ACTION IN OUR MODERN COURTS 8 (2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/2014-
SOJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2GD-KSNF]). 
 71. Thomas Clarke and Rebecca Sandefur have since conducted a preliminary program 
evaluation of the LLLT model—also including structured interviews with 13 of the then 15 certified 
LLLTs—finding, among other conclusions, that the scope of representation appropriately provides the 
type of legal assistance that those with unmet civil legal needs require (e.g., help with filling out 
forms); that LLLTs were adequately competent for the task at hand; and that the model will need to 
scale in order to achieve sustainable funding. See CLARKE & SANDEFUR, supra note 65, at 8–9, 13. 
The evaluation notes that the objective of the model is to “increase access to justice for low- and 
moderate-income persons.” See id. at 6. However, the framework developed for their evaluation, 
which they propose more generally to evaluate other “roles beyond lawyers” models, does not 
explicitly seek to evaluate how the LLLT model’s design will influence whether clients’ low- or 
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breakdown of the methodology used to obtain their responses can be found 
in the Appendix.72 What follows here briefly recounts the process and 
reasoning behind the method, as well as some of its limitations. 
In the fall of 2015, the first two cohorts of LLLTs and Candidates 
received an invitation to participate in this study. The study defined LLLTs 
as those who had completed all of the LLLT licensing requirements, 
including passing the LLLT bar exam, while LLLT Candidates included 
those who had enrolled in, if not taken, the required classes but either had 
not yet taken the exam or had not yet passed. Of the potential respondents, 
15 of 17 LLLTs and 21 of 36 Candidates participated, for an overall 
participation rate of approximately 68%.73 
The study divided the sample into two groups and administered 
different methods of inquirysemi-structured phone interviews for 
LLLTs and online surveys for Candidatesto obtain responses from as 
many of the initial participants as possible while building in room to dive 
more deeply into the anticipated work models of those who were closest 
to starting their LLLT careers.74 The distinction between the two groups 
ends there. Accordingly, the groups’ aggregated responses appear below.  
A hybrid approach that combines qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, as here, provides a particularly good methodological fit for 
provisional theoretical models, such as the LLLT scheme, which has until 
now existed only in concept and has not established itself enough to merit 
a more rigorous quantitative test about how it works.75 We cannot 
necessarily project participants’ answers to other LLLT cohorts down the 
road nor to legal paraprofessional licensing schemes that other states 
develop based on the LLLT model. Rather, the responses shared here 
                                                     
moderate-income status will determine whether they benefit from these models. See generally id.; 
Rebecca L. Sandefur & Thomas M. Clarke, Designing the Competition: A Future of Roles Beyond 
Lawyers? The Case of the USA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1468 (2016). 
 72. See infra app. A – Methodology Details. 
 73. The responses can be said to reflect those of the LLLT population in Washington, given the 
response rate and that the analysis does not generalize the responses to a wider population outside of 
the state. See Mario Luis Small, ‘How Many Cases Do I Need?’: On Science and the Logic of Case 
Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5, 17–18, 28 (2009) (critiquing small-n studies 
that mimic large-n generalizable sampling methods and instead calling for alternatives like case studies 
that allow for a chance to analyze exceptional circumstances and produce hypotheses based on logical 
rather than statistical inferences). The present study did not randomize the selection of participants 
because the sampling pool was coextensive with the entire population and thus did not need to be 
randomized to generalize responses to a wider population. Similarly, the study was not an experiment 
testing independent variables, so the design did not include a control group. 
 74. See infra app. B – Questionnaire. Candidates completed surveys anonymously; LLLTs had 
to disclose their identities to the author in order to coordinate their interviews but gave their informed 
consent that their names would not be further disclosed in association with their answers. Harvard’s 
Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved the study design and instruments. 
 75. See Amy C. Edmondson & Stacy E. McManus, Methodological Fit in Management Field 
Research, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1155, 1160, 1165 (2007). 
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reflect only the perspectives of the initial cohorts of Washington State’s 
LLLTs and Candidates as one case study. 
There are several limitations. First, the study captures a moment very 
early in the development of the model. Experiments evolve. For instance, 
participants’ anticipated pricing could change over time with feedback 
from clients, potential clients, lawyers, and each other, among other 
factors. The analysis also relies on self-reported data, which risks flaws, 
for example when people do not or cannot discern their genuine 
motivations or even feel social pressure to say what they think people want 
to hear rather than what they really believe. The Article also faces the same 
challenge as LLLTs and Candidates: a lack of market data detailing who 
would use legal technician services, why, how often, where, with what 
income, for what purpose, and at what price point. This relies as needed 
on what seem to be reasonable assumptions about these factors, but they 
are assumptions nonetheless. Finally, LLLTs had engaged only a handful 
of clients by the time of these interviews. Future studies will better answer 
whether LLLTs will increase access to justice for low-income populations 
by: comparing and contrasting the financial situations and backgrounds of 
clients who retain an LLLT versus those who decide against or cannot; 
assessing the outcomes of pro se litigants compared with those who get 
LLLT assistance; or even longitudinal comparisons between markets that 
have a scheme like the LLLT model and those that do not to see whether 
introducing the model appears to lower the price of legal services and close 
the civil justice gap in those markets over time. 
Nonetheless, the data shared here offer a critical perspective. The 
goals, fears, and needs of the founding LLLT cohorts will shape the 
model’s first steps and thus how it unfolds.  
II. THE LLLT MODEL IS NOT DESIGNED TO INCREASE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE FOR LOW-INCOME LEGAL CONSUMERS 
The belief that the LLLT model can lower the cost of legal services 
for low-income consumers rests on at least one of several major 
assumptions. First, by tackling simpler aspects of the law, LLLTs can 
differentiate the legal market and create legal service options that lead to 
lower, more competitive prices overall.76 Second, LLLTs will not simply 
work for law firms or in solo practice charging slightly lower prices than 
attorneys; rather, they will innovate legal service delivery models to 
                                                     
 76. See CHARN & ZORZA, supra note 44, at 15; Chambliss, supra note 31, at 589, 596, 599; 
Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 613–14; Holland, supra note 19, at 125–27; Richard Zorza 
& David Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to Justice, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1262, 1313 (2016), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www. 
google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2545&context=ulj [https://perma.cc/J5KH-FLCU].  
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increase access for low-income clients.77 Further, LLLT licensing will 
attract talent who are committed to addressing the unmet civil legal needs 
of low-income populations.78 This Article challenges these assumptions 
and finds that the inability to accept them leaves reasonable doubt that the 
LLLT model will increase access to justice for low-income legal 
consumers. 
A. The Continuing Structural Constraints of the Legal Market 
The LLLT model stands poised to replicate the same principles that 
keep lawyers’ prices high, as identified by Gillian Hadfield.79 Markets that 
are not truly competitive artificially inflate prices because they reflect 
what consumers will pay rather than the value of the services. In law, this 
happens due to its complexity (its resource-intensive training; overhead 
costs; the unpredictability of the final cost; the tendency of parties to 
compete for greater relief; prices signaling lawyers’ competence); the state 
monopoly over legal professionals’ licensing and parties’ dispute 
resolution; and the unified nature of the profession.80 Similar logic applies 
to LLLTs. The model reimagines but does not ultimately alter the multi-
variable nature of a legal action. The state still maintains a monopoly over 
the licensing of LLLTs as legal practitioners, and those practitioners must 
continue to work within the formal court system to establish enforceable 
agreements. And the nature of LLLTs’ work can still be characterized as 
unified, as LLLTs do not offer a skill set distinct from lawyers but one that 
is more limited in scope and subsumed within the type of services that 
lawyers already offer. 
The model attempts to lower the complexity and price of legal 
services through offering simplified services for more narrowly tailored 
needs. It aims to do this by lowering the cost of training, promoting 
unbundled and limited scope services, and, at least theoretically, 
encouraging lower costs through more predictable flat-fee pricing 
schemes.81 However, as Hadfield points out, the educational debt that 
                                                     
 77. See Chambliss, supra note 31, at 588–90, 597, 608 n.211; Robinson, supra note 11, at 4 n.4; 
Zorza & Udell, supra note 76, at 1271, 1275–76, 1279, 1283–86; Hon. Barbara Madsen, Chief Justice, 
Washington Supreme Court, The Promise and Challenges of Limited Licensing, Luncheon Keynote 
Address (Spring, 2014), in 65 S.C. L. REV. 533, 545 (2014) (“There are many creative ways to deliver 
services. Most states allow unbundled legal services. I see a hopeful note that our new lawyers will 
find new innovative ways to make the delivery of legal services more affordable.”). 
 78. See supra Part I, notes 60–66 and corresponding text; see also Crossland & Littlewood, supra 
note 41, at 620 (noting that LLLT students are “highly motivated . . . pioneers”). 
 79. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 957. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 
898 (2009) (an “increasingly popular strategy” for innovative legal service delivery is “unbundled 
discrete services that provide a less costly alternative to full representation”); Zorza & Udell, supra 
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lawyers carry into the profession plays only a small role in pricing.82 The 
ABA has also started to encourage attorneys to practice unbundled, limited 
scope services through revising its Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
to allow this when reasonable and with the client’s consent.83 And as 
LLLTs and Candidates reveal below, other components of the legal 
market—the cost of doing business; the unpredictability of legal services 
required to solve an issue; the nature of parties to compete for a more 
favorable outcome in opposition to one another; and the significance of 
colleagues’ and competitors’ prices in determining one’s own—will 
continue to complicate and inflate case prices. Accordingly, the allocation 
of LLLT efforts, like those of lawyers, will nonetheless skew towards 
those willing and able to pay higher prices for their services. 
We see this reflected in LLLTs’ and Candidates’ responses about 
how they plan to price their services. Admittedly, LLLTs and Candidates 
often expressed doubt about how to price their services, particularly as 
they start out. Most planned to charge some if not all clients based on an 
hourly rate. Estimated hourly rates ranged from $40 to $175 per hour, with 
a median of about $100 per hour.84 Some also thought that they might 
charge flat fees, either as an option for certain cases or exclusively. 
Estimated flat fees ranged from $300 to $2,500 per case,85 with a median 
of about $750 per case. Assuming an average of 10 hours per case,86 
                                                     
note 76, at 1266–67; D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, How 
Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts 
Housing Court 37 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished working paper), http://legalaidresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/Greiner-Massachusetts-Housing-Court-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R94-HNX3] 
(finding no statistically significant evidence that legal aid provider giving full representation to clients, 
as opposed to limited assistance, had any appreciable effect on outcome or case substance); Cf. D. 
James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal 
Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 901, 901–02 (2013) (challenging the premise that unbundled legal services allow 
service providers to reach more of those in need compared to those receiving traditional, full-service 
legal assistance). 
 82. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 983–84. 
 83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 84. See infra fig.1. 
 85. See infra fig.1. The LLLT who estimated charging the highest flat rate stated that she planned 
to charge $3,000 per case, but explicitly stated that this included the filing fees, so the highest rate here 
is listed as $2,500 assuming $500 worth of filing fees to keep consistent with the other prices 
estimated, which respondents did not say included filing fees. 
 86. LLLTs and Candidates mostly indicated that the hours per case would vary too widely to 
estimate. The handful of respondents who ventured an estimate most frequently said that they would 
spend about 6–10 hours per case, or thought the hours would vary more widely from 5–20 or 5–30 
hours per case. These figures used the rough average of these responses to estimate that LLLTs would 
spend about 10 hours on each case. 
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LLLTs would charge on average approximately $1,000 per case whether 
charging an hourly rate or flat fee.87 
 




                                                     
 87. See infra fig.1. If someone suggested they might use a mixed-pricing approach, potentially 
charging an hourly rate and/or a flat fee depending on the case (e.g., a flat fee for an uncontested 
divorce but hourly if a divorce involved children), this chart reflects the rate provided for each. Three 
respondents mentioned that they would try using a sliding scale, charging rates that vary based on 
clients’ incomes. See LLLT Interviews 001–014; LLLT Surveys 1–21. 
 88. Of the LLLTs and Candidates asked how much time they thought they would spend on each 
case, respondents most frequently indicated that they did not know or that the cases would vary too 
widely to estimate. See LLLT Surveys 1–21; LLLT Interviews 001–014. However, a recent report, for 
example, found that attorneys spend an average of 16.4 hours per pro bono case where they provide 
limited scope representation. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. 
FOR PRO BONO, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 
6 (Apr. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_ 
service/ls_pb_supporting_justice_iv_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3RZ-N6LM]. Thus, 
assuming 10 hours per case with an LLLT provides a conservative and reasonable estimate. 
Fig. 1: Engaging an LLLT would cost clients an average of $1,000 per case 
based on the hourly and flat fees anticipated by LLLTs and Candidates and 
assuming that LLLTs spend 10 hours on each case. 
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At these rates, for those living paycheck-to-paycheck, even a couple 
days’ worth of LLLT assistance costs a significant amount of money. As 
one LLLT put it: 
Personally, I would be trying to target the moderate means people. 
People like myself even. We’re certainly not poor in anyway and yet 
if I had to come up with $5,000 for a retainer I’d take on, oh geez. 
Let’s see where we can eke that out. It’s tough. That’s minimum. A 
family law case may be less, maybe $2,500. It depends, kids or no 
kids.89 
The challenge to pay is especially true for someone whose financial 
situation hangs in the balance—someone going through a divorce, 
eviction, or health challenge. In other words, some of the very same people 
the LLLT model sets out to assist. As one LLLT put it:  
 
I expect that most [clients] are probably going to be at or below the 
federal poverty level. Or, well, I shouldn’t say below. I imagine I’m 
probably going to get some lower or middle-class people who still 
can’t afford attorneys, but who could afford to pay something. And 
then the people who are at or around the federal poverty level—I 
imagine that they should be able to come up with the funds to pay for 
it. They can, with family members helping out, or by taking 
payments. . . . I mean, $500 is a lot to someone like that, but I think 
that with some help they could come up with that.90 
 
In fact, assuming that potential clients would be willing and able to 
spend even half a paycheck on LLLT services, 100% of Washington’s 
population living at or below 125% of the federal poverty line and about 
85% of those living at or below 200% of the federal poverty line still could 
not afford an LLLT.91 Even those who could afford it would need to find 
and engage those LLLTs charging a total cost at the low end of the 
spectrum.92 Those living paycheck to paycheck may not even be willing 
or able to spend that much of their paycheck on legal services. Further, as 
LLLTs discussed, the hours for a given case can vary widely.93 These 
models assume that each case takes ten hours, but some cases will take 
more and would further limit the ability of those earning such incomes to 
afford an LLLT, at least on an hourly basis. Based on these figures, the 
                                                     
 89. LLLT Interview 013. 
 90. LLLT Interview 001. 
 91. See infra fig.2. 
 92. See infra fig.2. 
 93. See supra note 86. 
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LLLT model does not give us reason to believe that it will increase access 
to justice for low-income populations. 
 
Figure 2 – No Households < 125% FPL and Limited Households 
< 200% FPL Afford an LLLT94 
                                                     
 94. This estimate uses the 2014 federal poverty guidelines used in the 2015 Civil Legal Needs 
Study, the 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS), and about 2.5 as the average household size for 
U.S. households based on the 2010 U.S. Census Data. See CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2015, supra 
note 13, at 11; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, https://www.census. 
gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html; DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS 
BRIEFS: HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES 5 (Apr. 2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/ 
c2010br-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WEN-XVKU]. This estimates that the average Washington 
household living at 125% FPL earned approximately $21,900 and average households at 200% FPL 
earned about $35,520. 
Fig. 2: Assuming that a household would be willing to put aside half of a bi-monthly 
paycheck to pay for legal assistance in a civil case, no individuals living under 125% 
of the federal poverty level could afford the estimated average cost of engaging an 
LLLT on a case. Using the same estimates, none of the households earning less than 
200% of the federal poverty level could afford the median estimated cost of $1,000 to 
engage an LLLT on their case. Only the top percentage of households earning under 
200% FPL could afford any LLLT services, bringing in at most an estimated $35,520 
per year. Even so, these households would need to find an LLLT willing to take their 
case for about $740 total, which is on the low end of the estimated range of total cost 
for an LLLT to take the case. 
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Figure 3 – Est. 35% Washington Households Newly Served by 




These suggestions identify perhaps the primary challenge for the 
model: How low can legal fees go? Will any price above free ever close 
the civil justice gap? How can LLLTs afford to provide services 
sustainably at that price, or can they? These questions reflect the core 
inquiry in Gillian Hadfield’s classic analysis on the price of lawyers: Why 
                                                     
 95. Figure 3 assumes that lawyers would charge $250 per hour for comparable services based on 
an informal survey of visitors to Nolo’s website. See Kathleen Michon, How Much Will My Divorce 
Cost and How Long Will It Take?, NOLO (last visited July 22, 2018), https://www.nolo.com/ 
legal-encyclopedia/ctp/cost-of-divorce.html [https://perma.cc/8NNN-YJW4]. 
Fig. 3: The LLLT model could open up affordable legal assistance for approximately 
35% of Washington households, while remaining unaffordable for approximately 
40% of Washington households. The figure bases its estimates on LLLTs’ anticipated 
pricing and data from the 2014 Census exhibiting how many households exist at each 
income level in Washington State. The figure assumes that lawyers would charge 
about $250 per hour for comparable services, according to Nolo. The figure again 
assumes, as in Figures 1 and 2, that each case would take 10 hours and that a client-
household would be willing to pay half of a bi-monthly paycheck for legal assistance 
in a civil case.  
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do lawyers cost so much?96 Similarly, here we ask: why will LLLTs still 
cost so much? 
A central assumption of the LLLT model is that legal technicians can 
offer lower prices if they have less debt to pay off from their legal training. 
Adam Smith offers the reasoning behind this traditional economic 
explanation: “High wages in a profession are necessary to compensate an 
entrant when great expenses must be incurred for learning its trade.”97 As 
one LLLT hypothesized: “I think a lot of [the pricing] tracks back to the 
length and cost of the education. . . . I don’t know if it’s the key, but it’s a 
key certainly to why a legal technician can charge less than an attorney.”98 
Along this line of thinking, as the cost of law school has risen, so has debt 
upon graduation for so many lawyers. Because of that, graduates may seek 
high paying jobs or keep their prices on pace with their inflated debts (or 
both) in order to afford to pay back that kind of debt.99 In contrast, the 
average cost of an LLLT education is only $15,000 total. That number 
drops to around $3,000 for those with at least their associate’s degree who 
only need to complete the requisite law school coursework.100 Compared 
to the average cost of a juris doctor—upwards from $36,000 annually as a 
non-resident student at a public institution to $42,000 annually at a private 
institution101—the difference could be significant enough to relax 
graduates’ drive towards well-paying firm jobs or their pressure to charge 
prices as high as attorneys. 
Yet Hadfield’s analysis dispels a common myth: attorneys’ law 
school debt does not determine the cost of law. Other nuances shape legal 
market pricing. For example, because law is a credence good where the 
expert service provider also determines the buyer’s needs, like doctors and 
car mechanics, clients cannot easily assess upfront the extent or quality of 
the service they need.102 Often, neither can the professionals themselves.103 
This unpredictability makes clients vulnerable to ballooning costs as the 
professional uncovers or even invents the total bill.104 Relatedly, the 
adversarial system is liable to create a winner-take-all outcome or 
mentality that leads to legal one-upmanship and corresponding costs. 
Furthermore, consumers may use prices to anticipate the quality of the 
                                                     
 96. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 954. 
 97. See id. at 964 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
 98. LLLT Interview 004. 
 99. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 1001. 
 100. Interview with Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 35. 
 101. These figures come from the most recent publicly available calculations from the American 
Bar Association. Statistics, Law School Tuition (1985–2013; Public/Private), AM. BAR ASS’N (2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html. 
 102. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 968. 
 103. See id. at 969. 
 104. See id. at 968–69. 
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good: you get what you pay for. Knowing this, lawyers often use prices to 
signal their expertise to consumers.105 They may also rely on prices or 
salaries to signal their expertise to themselves: professionals want to be 
paid what they see as a fair price for their services. Education aside, 
practicing law also incurs costs: malpractice insurance, research tool 
licensing, court costs, filing fees, and even the cost of doing business like 
office space, equipment, supplies, and utilities.106 These costs are in 
addition to the licensing barriers to entry that result in the monopoly that 
is, or has been, the legal profession.107 
We do not have reason to believe the LLLT model will break from 
this. Clients will still face uncertain needs and gamesmanship, perhaps 
especially in family law. LLLTs will still gauge their prices by looking up, 
down, and sideways to signal what they offer and where they fall in the 
hierarchy of legal services quality. LLLT services will still incur base costs 
to do business. Even though more people standing in line will get into the 
legal professional club, the LLLT licensing scheme overall perpetuates the 
profession’s traditional monopoly on legal services. 
1. Parallel Market Structures 
Uncertainty about what it will take for a lawyer to solve a legal issue 
drives up costs. Even for lawyers, it can be tough to tell whether a case 
will take ten hours, ten months, or ten years. As Hadfield notes, “Law is 
not merely complex. It is so complex that it is also highly ambiguous and 
unpredictable. The necessity and quality of legal services are not merely 
difficult for nonexperts to judge; they are also difficult for experts, even 
the expert providing the service, to judge. This magnifies the credence 
problem dramatically.”108 Procedural and substantive legal nuance do not 
alone comprise the complexity of law. Idiosyncrasies of the parties, 
lawyers, and judges—their “past experiences, personal values, time, 
cognitive biases and limitations, politics”—all contribute to the “human 
judgment and communication” that makes law come to life.109 Each case 
provides its own permutation. How the elements combine can lead to 
resolution, combustion, or something in between. Nowhere is this 
spectrum truer, perhaps, than family law.110 Sensitivities lead to 
unpredictability, which leaves clients vulnerable to skyrocketing costs as 
                                                     
 105. See id. at 975. 
 106. See id. at 957. 
 107. See id. at 982. 
 108. See id. at 969.  
 109. See id. at 969–70. 
 110. See Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2114–
23 (2013) (explaining why providing attorneys to all family law litigants might not help, and might 
even hurt parties, in part by escalating dynamics and protracting problems into battles). 
2018] Law by Non-Lawyers 27 
the case unfolds. Clients may not know whether to agree to pay for a 
service when they cannot know the full cost upfront; how to verify whether 
a charge is reasonable and appropriate for the quality of the service 
provided; or how to compare the quality of one person’s services to 
another, obfuscating the information needed for a truly competitive 
market.111 This informational asymmetry leaves a client at the mercy of 
his lawyer’s pronouncement about the work and corresponding cost.112 
These uncertainties will persist with the LLLT model. While some 
LLLTs and Candidates plan to experiment using models that charge their 
clients flat fees, most plan to charge their clients on an hourly basis.113 
 
Figure 4 – LLLTs and Candidates Predominantly Anticipate Using 
Hourly Rates to Bill Clients114 
 
LLLTs and Candidates’ rationales for using hourly fees echo the 
concerns raised by Hadfield: uncertainty about what the case will entail 
and a corresponding fear on the part of the professionals that flat fees will 
not cover the time they will ultimately spend resolving the matter. Like 
lawyers, LLLTs struggle to estimate the resources a given case will 
require. Of the 23 LLLTs and Candidates asked to approximate how much 
time they thought they would spend working on each case, 15 either would 
                                                     
 111. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 970–71. 
 112. See id. at 968–69. 
 113. See supra fig.4. 
 114. Respondents could indicate that they intended to use both hourly and flat rates if they would 
consider using both, so this chart reflects multiple responses. 
Fig. 4: Of the 26 LLLTs and Candidates who answered this question, the majority anticipates 
using hourly rates to charge clients, though not necessarily mutually exclusive to flat rates. 
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not venture an estimate or explained that it was too difficult to estimate 
because cases vary too widely.115 
“Each client’s case—they’re so different,” one LLLT emphasized.116 
Time spent on the case “would depend on how complex it is,” another 
explained.117 One Candidate added, “If I need to do research, it will take 
longer than if I do not . . . [and] if there are parenting issues, it will take 
longer than if there are no parenting issues.”118 Plus, clients’ expectations 
can evolve. One LLLT started off using flat fees but “learn[ed] . . . [that] 
people always want questions, they always have changes, they always 
have this, they always have that.” She decided to still offer a flat fee, but 
once the documents are completed, anything in addition “would have to 
be billed out at the hourly rate.”119 
The potential for a client’s matter to snowball is especially potent in 
family law, where the action often involves divorcing spouses or parties 
who otherwise exist in a state of personal tension. Tensions running high 
can run up legal bills.120 One LLLT explained that she would consider 
doing flat fees, but “in general family law stuff doesn’t work like that. It’s 
so fluid. One day they agree and the next day they hate each other’s guts. 
I think it’s safer to keep everyone happy to generally do it on an hourly 
basis.”121 Another LLLT shared similar sentiments: 
[W]here there’s going to be people that don’t agree, and then high-
conflict people where everything is argued about, or there are 
accusations or domestic violence or that sort of thing, or people are 
not being forthcoming with their financial information so that you 
can’t really get things done outside of court, it can drag on. So, those 
are hard to gauge. Sometimes things go fine, and then, there’s 
something that one person will dig in their heels about and not go 
forward.122 
Another reiterated: “[S]o much of it is controlled by the opposing 
party.”123 As their experience indicates, despite LLLTs’ focus on simple 
cases, they and their clients will continue to face the challenge of correctly 
gauging the complexity of a case on its face, which will continue to make 
it hard to price out the full cost of the action at its start. 
                                                     
 115. LLLT Interviews 001–014; LLLT Surveys 1–21. 
 116. LLLT Interview 012. 
 117. LLLT Interview 011. 
 118. LLLT Survey 2. 
 119. LLLT Interview 007. 
 120. See Aviel, supra note 110, at 2114–23. 
 121. LLLT Interview 003. 
 122. LLLT Interview 014. 
 123. LLLT Interview 002. 
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Similarly, those who hire LLLTs will still encounter the game of law. 
In an adversarial system, having a better lawyer means you could go home 
with more and lose less.124 Because there is almost no way to know in 
advance how the two lawyers will match up, a client always has the 
incentive to pay for the best lawyer she can afford to hedge her bets.125 
Such one-upmanship will persist with LLLTs. Some matters may resolve 
quickly, like uncontested divorces.126 Yet if the above insights are any 
indication, many if not all cases run the risk of turning contentious, 
particularly in family law because of the very nature of the matters that 
parties bring to file.127 Many LLLTs and Candidates note this. As one 
LLLT quipped, “It’s really easy to get married and really hard to get 
divorced.”128 Not every case needs to be seen as a win or a loss; creative 
solutions may exist where both parties can feel like they are winning (or 
losing). Even so, the parties can win or lose assets to be divided, or the 
custody of a child. In those cases, stronger legal assistance can matter, 
especially in making sure that assets and time with children are not treated 
as mutually exclusive and not negotiated to the party’s disadvantage. 
Parties in any legal dispute can be tempted to lawyer up and pay for the 
best service they can get, even when relief only entails profits or reputation 
in a commercial dispute. Yet in family law, the outcome can affect parties’ 
life savings, the home they have made, and the children they have raised 
and loved. In other words, family law can entail some of the “assets” that 
parties value above all else—assets central to their identity. Even as 
LLLTs expand their reach to other areas of law, landlord-tenant or elder 
care, as the architects of the model have discussed,129 the topic areas still 
involve deeply personal matters. These can be parties in danger of losing 
their home or in need of resources to live out the end of their lives.130 With 
these kinds of dynamics, those who would consider hiring an LLLT for 
their civil case do not necessarily appear any less likely to possess a 
“winner takes all” mentality where they would be willing to pay for the 
best LLLT they can afford.131 
Hourly rates also compound the feeling that switching the source of 
legal assistance in the middle of a matter can be costly in terms of money, 
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time, and energy. Clients and their counsel often get to know one another 
and develop a relationship as they work together.132 Lawyers invest in 
learning the case and develop rapport with opposing counsel.133 Clients 
invest time and energy explaining their case to their lawyer.134 Once a 
client hires a lawyer, she can start to feel like she would lose too much 
momentum if she decided to use another lawyer instead.135 In other words, 
the difficulty in seeing these investments as sunk costs can frustrate a 
client’s desire to work with someone else once she invests in working with 
a particular counselor or starts litigating.136 Knowing this and thus the low 
probability of losing a client’s business, a lawyer may take his time 
resolving the matter or invest less into the case, especially if he does not 
expect to work with the client again in a future case.137 
LLLT–client relationships may not differ in this sense. An LLLT still 
must get up to speed on her client’s case, and handing off a case to another 
LLLT or a lawyer would still entail transition costs.138 Lawyers or fellow 
LLLTs who receive the case may also be disinclined to pick up in the 
middle of a case for the same reasons.139 Even if the LLLT model presents 
an opportunity to unbundle services and assist clients on discrete tasks,140 
those cases can still grow, complicate, and sprawl in a way that that the 
client does not wish to start all over again in the middle of the case with 
another adviser. The model thus does not overcome the sunk-cost problem 
that can artificially inflate lawyers’ pricing. 
LLLTs could try to keep overall costs lower simply because they are 
trained to tackle simpler issues. Because of that simplicity, LLLTs may be 
better equipped than lawyers to unbundle their services or charge flat fees, 
if only from a matter of perspective. Their clients may only need someone 
who knows how to fill out the right forms or draw up an appropriate 
agreement without delving into a drawn-out, complicated analysis 
applying ambiguous laws to ambiguous facts in a particular case.141 
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LLLTs can perhaps more naturally offer à la carte, unbundled services 
where they can more easily charge a set fee for a discrete task like filling 
out or reviewing a particular document that has to be filed. Some are 
already planning to use such a model: 
When someone would come to you, you would figure out what the 
solution was, what the options were, advise them, find out what they 
wanted to do, show them a quote for the documents that they want 
prepared, and it would be by document rather than by hour per se. 
That’s what I’m expecting most LLLTs to do. A lot of us have already 
talked about that. I think it works well for the population it is serving. 
They’re looking to save money, they want to know exactly what it’s 
going to be.142 
In other words, the LLLT model may increase transparency of the 
cost of legal services through offering simpler services that lend 
themselves to flat fee pricing. The ability to charge flat fees could make 
LLLTs’ services more attractive to those who otherwise avoid lawyers 
because of the unknown total bill at the end. As one LLLT described: 
I know that if I want to go hire somebody like me, I would want to 
know how much it was going to cost, as much as possible, upfront. 
And so, I tend to like the flat fee where they know, for this certain 
product, this is how much they’re going to have to pay.143 
The model could even make the legal market more competitive by 
allowing people to compare the costs for the same or similar services, or 
even potentially the quality of the service for the cost. 
The simplicity, transparency, and ability to verify quality could go 
so far as to build trust and satisfaction with clients who might otherwise 
distrust the service that lawyers would tell them they need to pay for.144 
One LLLT received such feedback from a client: 
I had a woman that just came in here just to have a parenting plan 
prepared. She had a hearing to go to, so I assisted her in preparing her 
parenting plan and explained to her how she needed to file it with the 
court and provide working papers and what to do at the hearing and 
what to expect at the hearing. And then I got an email from her just 
thanking me, and that they ended up accepting her parenting plan. So, 
she was happy with the services that I provided. I mean, that’s not 
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something you hear a lot in the legal world. Most of the time, you’re 
just like, you know... “This cost me an arm and a leg” or whatever, 
but she was very satisfied.145 
Even so, the LLLTs and Candidates planning to use flat fees do not 
represent the majority. And some of those who do plan to use flat fees 
caution that they might use hourly rates when cases seem like they will, or 
do, become complex or fraught. As one LLLT quoted above revealed, 
even if she merely prepares a document for someone, people always have 
questions and want changes.146 Another said she planned to use a flat fee 
based on how long she thought it would take her to prepare paperwork for 
a given case but, 
[A flat fee] doesn’t include you calling me every other day, you 
know. “Well I talked to my wife and she’s decided this, and oh, I 
talked to her again and she’s changed her mind.” It’s like, that’s not 
part of the flat fee. Once you get a very indecisive person, it’s very 
difficult. 
She planned to troubleshoot the issue through client management: “I 
just kind of remind them, ‘Look, I’ve done the job that you’ve hired me to 
do. I’ve made the changes that you’ve asked me to make. At this point, if 
you want me to do any further additional work, you’ll have to pay my 
hourly rate.’”147 Another planned to use flat fees to streamline her 
recordkeeping, but also admitted that she is under-billing at this point and 
thinks she is “not doing a really good job of evaluating how much work 
will be involved.”148 She added, “It’s so random.”149 Like the difficulties 
lawyers face in judging the value of their services, so, too, will LLLTs.150 
Still, nothing about the LLLT model changes the fundamental 
opacity of whether legal services make a difference in the first place.151 
Legal outcomes are highly unpredictable, which makes it difficult to 
determine not only whether the person providing the service used a 
necessary and sufficient amount of time and effort to fulfill her duties to 
her client but also whether her client prevailed because of or despite her 
efforts.152 The addition of LLLTs into the market will allow for the 
comparison of their outcomes and costs with those of lawyers in an attempt 
to evaluate whether the extent and style of legal training has anything to 
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do with the quality of services, at least by those measures. But even so, 
and certainly within the LLLT market, clients will still face the notorious 
difficulty of knowing that the quality of LLLTs’ services assuredly must 
differ but not knowing how to compare the quality and prices in order to 
make an informed decision about whether and who to hire.153 Accordingly, 
prices will still “be buffeted by beliefs based on signals of quality that are 
more or less spurious,” as with lawyers, and LLLTs will still enjoy a 
monopolistic advantage that allows them to charge the highest prices that 
clients would pay.154 
The LLLT model reflects the remaining pillars holding up the legal 
profession monopoly described by Hadfield. Artificial and natural barriers 
to entry will continue to limit the supply of legal professionals.155 Those 
wishing to become LLLTs must still invest non-trivial amounts of time 
and money into obtaining the requisite training before they can even take 
the LLLT bar exam.156 They must complete 3,000 practice hours 
supervised by an attorney—a requirement bar associations do not ask of 
lawyers who complete their juris doctor.157 Those who have decided to 
pursue their LLLT licensing must believe the requirements to be 
accomplishable or else they would not pursue the license. Even so, some 
candidates—especially those who did not come into the program as 
experienced paralegals—express doubts and frustration about the ability 
to achieve these prerequisites before taking the exam.158 If candidates who 
ultimately believe the requirements are feasible express this, then it is 
plausible that others who would consider completing the program, but do 
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not opt to pursue it, could be deterred by the requirements. Further, as of 
this writing, the LLLT program does not offer financial aid, so the 
opportunity is limited to those who can front the resources for the 
courses.159 As for the LLLT bar exam, though arguably less rigorous than 
the attorney bar exam, the test does not merely rubberstamp the credentials 
of those who have taken the courses.160 The exam means to ensure the 
quality of services provided, mimicking the function of the attorney bar 
exam and similarly preserving a smaller quota of those who can enter the 
market.161 In short, even with the arguably lower requirements for LLLTs 
to gain their license, the training and examination recreate the artificial 
barriers to entry encountered by aspiring lawyers. Besides, even as more 
lawyers have recently entered the market, their prices have gone up and 
jobs have gone down,162 which suggests that the profession’s artificial 
barriers to entry “are not at the root of the high cost of legal services.”163 
Natural barriers also persist. Hadfield argues that the limited number 
of opportunities to gain experience (i.e., trial experience) to make someone 
a top-notch lawyer, combined with a high standard for quality reasoning 
and analysis, creates a “naturally” limited supply of lawyers.164 Because 
of that, she concludes, free-market economics make lawyers a scarce 
resource, which goes “to the highest bidders.”165 As envisioned, the LLLT 
model makes quality legal assistance less scarce and aims to overcome the 
effect of scarcity on the price of legal assistance by taking on the legal 
issues of lower bidders—those otherwise left behind by lawyers catering 
to the highest bidders. However, as further discussed below,166 the LLLT 
model will not avoid recreating these dynamics. LLLTs will still serve the 
highest bidders among those who cannot afford a lawyer—the echelon just 
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below those who can afford a lawyer, who can still out-pay those with an 
even lower income. Unless they find work in the government or non-profit 
sector where public funding or other grants and donations could fund their 
work—which we do not have reason to believe will be the case 
generally167—LLLTs still need to charge enough to bring in enough 
revenue to earn a living. At least some LLLTs have indicated that this 
might skew their clientele towards those who can afford to pay higher 
prices.168 As long as demand for LLLTs still exceeds their supply,169 LLLT 
services will be “consequently priced as high as can be.”170 
What’s more, the LLLT model does not touch the state’s monopoly 
over the coercive power to enforce dispute resolution. Issues that LLLTs 
will handle, whether divorces and custody plans, or evictions and social 
security benefits down the road, must still pass through the hands of the 
state in order to make them real and give them force.171 As purveyors of 
the law, lawyers have a monopoly on navigating this dispute resolution 
mechanism:172  
In light of its monopoly over coercive dispute resolution, the unified 
and importantly homogeneous nature of the legal profession takes on 
tremendous importance. The profession defines and reproduces itself. 
It establishes entry requirements that homogenize the reasoning 
processes and to some extent the values of its members—judges, 
lawyers, even many legislators.173 
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LLLTs will now share in this power, but their responses about how 
they intend to practice shows that lawyers have made the LLLT model in 
their own image. LLLTs still rely on the state system (the forms, the 
courts, the resolutions) to assist their clients.174 Lawyers have designed the 
LLLT profession not only to preserve the quality of the practice of law but 
the manner in which legal professionals resolve disputes for their clients. 
Because of the complexity of legal processes and reasoning, “outsiders to 
the profession cannot easily assess their rights and obligations or the 
prospects for how their disputes will be resolved . . . .”175 For as long as 
the state holds this power and lawyers perpetuate the processes and 
reasoning that they value as the best or only means through which 
resolutions can come to pass, as they have with the LLLT model, then 
access to justice will continue to be an exclusive, elite good where 
outsiders will need to pay to play. Indeed, “[i]nnovations in dispute 
resolution . . . are unlikely to come from within the profession.”176 Non-
lawyers can offer alternative dispute resolution mechanisms—like the 
LLLT who wants to try to incorporate mediation into her practice177—but 
they can only be so successful as long as they lack the “free-standing 
coercive power and the resulting dependence on the legal mechanism for 
binding resolution of disputes.”178 Like lawyers, LLLTs will therefore 
function of, by, and for the state. The model extends, rather than disrupts, 
the monopoly of the legal profession over such dispute resolution. This 
essentially replicates how the market values legal assistance. Accordingly, 
the LLLT model does not suggest that it will meaningfully mitigate the 
effect of the profession’s monopoly on the price of its services. 
As we see, the LLLT model does not make a clean break from the 
structural components of the legal market that have led to the system’s 
pervasive inaccessibility. The complexity and uncertainty of the precise 
legal services required to solve a particular case; the adversarial system 
that incentivizes investing in and sticking with the same legal professional 
or team; the monopolistic barriers to entry of the profession; and the 
profession’s operating in service to the coercive power of the stateall 
proceed effectively uninterrupted with the LLLT model. 
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2. Parallel Gauging 
LLLTs and Candidates will also not price their services in a vacuum. 
They will look up, down, and sideways at the prices charged by lawyers, 
paralegals, legal assistants, and their fellow LLLTs in order to determine 
what a “fair” price looks like to customers and themselves. Doing so 
implies not only a price ceiling but a price floor above the rates that 
paralegals and legal assistants charge, meaning that LLLTs’ prices can 
only go so low. 
To be clear, based on the research, LLLTs anticipate charging lower 
prices than lawyers. As one LLLT started to meet with potential clients, 
she found that these individuals sometimes pushed back on whether they 
might be able to obtain similar services from an attorney for about the 
same cost.179 In response, she would share that lawyers’ services might 
cost $200 for the consultation and $250 per hour after that and, in so 
comparing, could gain a client while capping what she could charge.180 
Another worked as a paralegal at a firm that deals mostly with wealthy 
clientele, where even the less wealthy individuals must put down a $5,000 
retainer.181 “[P]eople can’t afford that,” she explained. “You tell them it’s 
going to be $500 to do all of your divorce papers and teach you on how to 
file and how to serve and how to present yourself in court—$500 looks 
pretty good.”182 Another set her pricing parameters as “[s]omething 
between the court facilitator reviewing your forms and paying a couple 
hundred dollars an hour for [an] attorney.”183 In other words, at least some 
LLLTs plan to charge less than lawyers in order to gain clients by 
leveraging the difference in price. 
Other LLLTs plan to charge less than lawyers because they did not 
think that they would offer the same level of services. “[T]he reason why 
I can charge less is because I can’t do everything an attorney can do,” one 
explained.184 To another, “[t]he ‘access to justice’ is that there’s going to 
be somebody who can give legal advice on certain topics in . . . family law, 
and can advise you, can draft pleadings for you, can fill certain roles, and 
it will be less than the hourly rate of an attorney, necessarily.”185 Yet she 
went on to elaborate that the pricing is a two-way street. She anticipated 
fielding questions about why someone would not just hire an attorney and 
why a prospective client should use her instead. To this, she planned to 
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respond, essentially, that LLLTs offer a different type and level of service 
more suited to the pricing: “[I]t’s kind of inherent in the fact that the hourly 
rate will be less than an attorney’s. Basically, you get what you pay for.”186  
Yet as much as LLLTs price their services based on lawyers’ fees, 
they will also base their prices on rates charged by paralegals and legal 
assistants. For some, this will happen because they previously worked in 
one of these roles and pursued their legal technician licensing to raise their 
pay. As one LLLT explained, 
I remember [in class] we had to look at this issue of pricing. I thought 
ultimately it’s going to be guided by the market. I’m going to be 
looking at what the people who are already licensed are charging, or 
are able to charge. The tricky part is I think that something like $100–
$125 an hour meets the requirement of access to justice affordable 
representation for people, and yet I’m billed out at more than that as 
a paralegal and have been for several years. I’m stuck on that. You 
don’t want to pay more for a paralegal.187 
Another cautioned her fellow LLLTs not to undervalue their services 
based on what they might have been paid before as a paralegal, when they 
might have been underpaid in that role: 
I will probably charge around $100 an hour . . . . The thing is, like I 
said, some paralegals are paid, as paralegals, very low, and some very 
high. They might see themselves, if they’ve been paid low in the past, 
they might not realize their value if that makes any sense. . . . When 
I moved here, I was paid $15.50 an hour. That’s not going to cut it.188 
Another confirmed: “[M]y hourly rate of paralegal is, you know, 
pretty high. I mean, I know I think there was some article that we [LLLTs] 
might be charging $80 an hour. Well, that’s not very, I mean—that’s lower 
than my legal assistant rate, which is my low rate.”189 Those coming from 
paralegal and legal assistant roles did not express a willingness to charge 
a lower rate than what they previously charged. Others with similar levels 
of experience and pay from roles outside of the legal profession may have 
similar reservations about charging lower rates. In this sense, the model 
may encounter a price ceiling and floor. 
LLLTs themselves will further influence, or at least solidify, the rates 
charged by their fellow LLLTs. One did not see her rates fluctuating 
anytime soon but expected to “confirm in time maybe what other offices 
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would charge.”190 Another gauged her paralegal rates based in part on what 
paralegals at other firms charged. “[W]e would call around to find out what 
other paralegals were billing out at.”191 Now an LLLT, she and her firm 
decided to keep her rates the same for now at $110 per hour.192 If past 
actions are any indication of future actions, perhaps the firm will pursue a 
parallel approach to pricing her legal technician services based on what 
her LLLT peers charge. 
LLLTs are not only looking to charge prices below those of lawyers 
but also to maintain their prices on par with their peers and above those 
set by paralegals and legal assistants. Consequently, the LLLT model will 
not simply drive prices lower as the supply of legal professionals 
increases. Rather, as LLLTs indicate, their prices will hover above the 
rates earned by those already working in the legal profession supporting 
lawyers. Therefore, the model suggests that LLLTs’ prices will not 
necessarily race to the bottom as they encounter forces that also influence 
them to rise to the top. 
3. Parallel Costs 
The cost of doing business likewise limits how low LLLT costs can 
go. As with lawyers, LLLTs or their employers need to pay for business 
expenses such as malpractice insurance, research tool licensing, and basics 
like office space, equipment, and supplies.193 
Some LLLTs aspire to lower costs through lean business models that 
minimize their expenses and accordingly lower the prices they need to 
charge to cover costs and sustain their business. One LLLT explained that 
she planned to work from home so that she could charge lower prices in 
the solo practice she hoped to start: “I don’t want overhead. I don’t intend 
to charge my clients very much, the same like an attorney. My attorneys 
[where I work now] charge $300 an hour. I’m not going to charge 
anywhere near that. And so, I don’t want to pay for an office, and I don’t 
want to commute every day. So I would work from home, and I’d meet 
my clients at either public facilities like a Starbucks or a library, or I would 
do the rental office for an hour.”194 At the same time, she calculated: “[I]f 
I’m making over double my [current] hourly rates, and I don’t have any 
overhead, or very minimal overhead, I should sort of double my yearly 
salary . . . .”195 
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More commonly, LLLTs recognized that they would need to charge 
enough to cover overhead. For example, one LLLT who planned to 
practice on her own but team up with law firms to share office space started 
to realize that she would still need to pay for other expenses to get her 
practice off the ground: 
I have started at $150 an hour. That helps cover my expenses. 
Eventually I’m going to have to rent my space that I have now. Right 
now, I’m still staying employed. I hope to become part-time 
employed in my office suite. Then at that time I will be required to 
pay part of the rent for my office. Then there’s lots of software that 
you need. I didn’t realize. Those, you have to have subscriptions for 
that. Right now, I don’t have a full business plan, so I just kind of 
went with that [price].196 
One LLLT believed that the effect of overhead on LLLTs’ prices 
would especially impact those planning to fly solo: 
[P]eople who are in a firm already as a paralegal, and they are just 
going to stay in that role and also do LLLT work, they have it sweet. 
They don’t have to establish infrastructure. They don’t have to pay 
for liability insurance. They’re not putting themselves out. There’s 
no risk . . . .197 
One wanted to charge about $100 to $125 per hour in order to make 
her services “meet[] the requirement of access to justice affordable 
representation for people,” but also grappled with the fact that “there’s 
going to be very unfortunately the overhead cost of putting out your own 
shingle. You’ve got to factor that in.” 198 She did not yet know how to price 
her services to account for this: “I’m a little unsure of that discrepancy 
between the cost of the paralegal and the cost of the LLLT. Hopefully the 
seven people who are already licensed, I think it is now, will be able to 
guide the rest of us on what the fee structuring looks like.”199 Others shared 
in her uncertainty—and optimism. One LLLT expected to keep her costs 
lean and double her salary, but also noted, “I have not really done the 
math . . . .”200 Another confessed: “Obviously, I don’t have a specific idea 
of the costs because I don’t really know the space. It’s just some 
unknowns, which is a bit scary.”201 
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At least some LLLTs acknowledge that the overhead costs will make 
it challenging for LLLTs to charge lower rates than lawyers. As one LLLT 
put it: 
One of the criticisms, which we have yet to really answer because 
this is so new, is that the LLLTs are going to have to charge close to 
what a lawyer charges to pay their overhead. So, it’s not really a 
program that’s going to help the low to middle income people.202 
If LLLTs cannot reduce their costs and attendant prices, they will 
struggle to close the justice gap for those with lower incomes. As the same 
LLLT summed up: 
I don’t think that LLLTs are going to help with those people who just 
cannot afford to pay any fees at all. They’re very poor. Because there 
are costs to having an LLLT practice and an LLLT might be able to 
take on one or two pro bono cases a year, but they really need to get 
paid enough to pay the bills and actually make some money, make a 
living. So, that part of it will be interesting to see how that works out 
for people if they’re able to make a living based on the idea of what 
their fees are going to be.203 
In other words, in the limbo of legal service costs, LLLTs and 
Candidates indicate that their prices can only go so low. They may be able 
to experiment with leaner models and shave costs such that they can 
charge prices that help those who cannot afford to pay for lawyers but can 
afford to pay for services just below lawyers’ prices. Yet none articulated 
a strategy or confidence that she could cut costs so significantly that she 
could drive overhead costs to a nominal figure. In this sense, the base costs 
of doing business will prove largely constant, which will prevent LLLTs 
from reducing their prices so significantly that those least able to pay will 
now be able to afford help.  
B. The Perpetuation of Traditional Service Delivery Models 
Rather than creating new mixed-sector or other innovative legal 
service delivery models, LLLTs and Candidates stand to replicate existing 
models and their corresponding challenges. We see this in their responses 
about where and how they intend to work as LLLTs. As one LLLT put it: 
I think a lot of us will use this license in a law firm. I think there are 
some people who will use it independently. As far as how successful 
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will it be? I think there’s a need out there. I don’t really know how 
it’s going to work out, we’ll just have to wait and see.204 
That LLLT’s conception of the future of the LLLT model did not 
include the possibility of LLLTs working in the non-profit or government 
sectors, or for a private company besides a law firm or any other more 
disruptive model. By and large, LLLTs and Candidates do not plan to 
pursue public sector work at non-profits or with government offices, 
including courthouses.205 Nor do they plan to seek work with for-profit 
companies outside of the law that might be able to hire them and improve 
private legal service delivery models such that clients can pay much lower 
costs.206 Instead, they primarily plan to pursue work based at law firms or 
open their own solo practices. 
By pursuing private work through models akin to those already 
employed by lawyers, LLLTs will similarly need to charge enough to turn 




                                                     
 204. See LLLT Interview 013. 
 205. See infra fig.5. 
 206. See infra fig.5. 
 207. Respondents could indicate that they intended to work in any of these ways, so Figure 5 
reflects multiple responses. 
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Figure 5 – LLLTs and Candidates Mostly Plan to Work at a Law 
Firm or Start Their Own Practice 
Fig. 5: When asked about all of the settings in which LLLTs and Candidates intended to 
practice, respondents most frequently indicated that they planned to work at a law firm or start 
their own practice. Some respondents also said they thought they would work at a non-profit 
organization, courthouse, or other government office. Almost none thought they would work as 
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Figure 6 – LLLTs and Candidates Mostly Plan to Work in Private 
Practice 
1. Limited Pursuit of Public Sector Work 
LLLTs and Candidates mostly do not plan to pursue work in the 
public sector.208 Of the 36 study participants, 10 anticipate that they will 
work at a non-profit organization, government office, or courthouse. Of 
those individuals, only 2 plan to focus on public sector work exclusively 
without also considering work at a law firm or her own practice.209 
Perhaps this hesitation can best be summed up by one LLLT who 
said that she had talked to a lot of people about potentially engaging her 
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LLLT services. “Most of them don’t have any money,” so “they’re looking 
for legal services that are free for the most part.”210 She explained: “Right 
now I can’t afford to be doing a lot of pro bono work until I get things up 
and off the ground . . . .”211 She “think[s] working for a non-profit firm 
helping people with [her] license would be great,” but added, “I don’t 
know that it would bring in the kind of income I might want and it might 
require more of my time for the amount of income I would get.”212 For her, 
helping those who do not think they can afford to pay for legal services 
would be the icing on her cake, but for the same reason she does not expect 
that such work can serve as her bread and butter—she thinks clients who 
approach non-profits typically cannot afford to pay the kind of fees that 
would sustain the income she seeks, let alone enable her to work what she 
believed to be manageable hours. 
The question alone assumes that positions at non-profits would be 
available to LLLTs, but this may not be the case. Because such public 
sector work looks to provide services to those who otherwise could not 
afford them, clients’ fees alone generally cannot fund the work. Such work 
often relies on public or private grants. In fact, an LLLT who planned to 
pursue work at a non-profit and a courthouse was also coordinating a 
volunteer lawyer program part-time through the mercy of grant funding.213 
She said that the attorney’s services would be free for clients but admitted 
that she did not know if the model would work long-term because her work 
was premised on a grant that funded her time.214 
Her circumstances highlight the ongoing challenge in providing legal 
services to those who cannot afford to pay: there is an inherent catch-22, 
if not contradiction, in expecting that services for clients who cannot 
afford fees sufficient to cover the costs of the work can fund the work 
through a revenue stream without relying on grants in whole or in part. 
The LLLT model does not solve this catch-22. Even if LLLTs charge 
lower rates to align with the more basic legal skills they offer, the segment 
of the population with unmet civil needs who cannot afford to cover the 
costs of a legal service provider will still need to pursue services that are 
funded at least in part some other way—through grants, donations, or 
another source. Unless the public sector opportunities that might become 
available to LLLTs can conserve and spread their funding further by 
paying LLLTs lower incomes—which does not appear likely when LLLTs 
and Candidates largely do not expect to take a major pay cut in their work 
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and would not necessarily make that much less money than public interest 
lawyers as it is215—the challenge in public sector work appears less about 
finding legal service providers who are willing to work for less and more 
so in obtaining the grants or other funding that would allow government 
offices or non-profits to hire more individuals who can in turn provide 
services to more clients. Unless public sector opportunities can hire LLLTs 
at a salary low enough to allow them to hire additional staff members on 
their current budgets, the LLLT model will not go far in solving the 
conundrum facing the non-profits and government entities that try to serve 
those with unmet civil legal needs: finding the funding to cover the cost of 
the services provided to those who cannot afford to cover those costs 
themselves. Another LLLT identified this challenge: 
I don’t know if there’s a way that you can do a non-profit [LLLT 
model]. . . . I know that there are attorneys that do those type of 
services. So, I think that if someone wanted to investigate that 
avenue, and take it upon themselves to see what kind of services that 
[she] could provide at a reduced rate. . . . I mean attorneys could 
probably bill less if they wanted to, right?216 
She simply did not know how funding would work to sustain LLLTs’ 
not-for-profit work. It is hard to blame her. The dilemma of how to pay for 
services for those who cannot otherwise afford them has stumped the 
lawyers and public servants who have come before LLLTs. The model 
alone does not give us reason to believe that LLLTs will seek out or find 
work in a way that will solve that dilemma and help close the justice gap 
for low-income populations. 
2. Limited Pursuit of Private Sector Work Outside of Law Firms 
LLLTs and Candidates also largely do not plan to pursue work with 
businesses outside of the legal field. The LLLT model opens up the 
opportunity for private entities outside of the legal profession to move into 
the space in new ways. Specifically, LLLTs have such an opportunity 
because no rule bars them from sharing profits from legal practice with 
those outside of the legal profession, unlike lawyers guided by Model Rule 
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of Professional Conduct 5.4.217 Lawyers may not otherwise form 
partnerships with non-lawyers “if any of the activities of the partnership 
consist of the practice of law.” The Rule precludes a lawyer from 
practicing with or forming a professional corporation or association 
authorized to practice law for profit if a non-lawyer “owns any interest 
therein . . . ; is a corporate director or officer thereof . . . ; [or] has the right 
to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.”218 Translated 
into practice, investors and businesses outside of law have not been able 
to team up with law firms or other legal service providers to infuse capital, 
develop technology, or otherwise compete in the space in ways that are 
thought to help innovate an industry.219 Yet of the 36 participants, only 1 
included such work as a possibility.220 
APR 28, however, adds to the momentum to deregulate the legal 
profession. APR 28 does not clearly prohibit LLLTs from sharing profits 
with fellow non-lawyers.221 In other words, LLLTs could partner with 
investors or major corporations in industries outside of the legal 
profession, which could also create a whole new norm for delivering legal 
services.222 For instance, a company like Wal-Mart could hire LLLTs to 
provide legal services in their stores, like “Minute Clinics” in 
pharmacies,223 increasing legal service providers’ visibility and perhaps 
eliminating much of the overhead that they would otherwise need to 
provide if they hung their own shingles. Such a model could respond more 
quickly to the market than law firms do, with access to capital and 
management by professional business managers.224 The model could turn 
LLLT services into a volume game by making legal services more 
conveniently available at a low cost. The concept mimics the idea behind 
the success of advice centers in the United Kingdom225 or South Africa226 
by decreasing the barrier for consumers to use the service by making them 
more conveniently available to find and access—a common reason that 
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people in Washington have given for not obtaining legal services.227 
Similarly, LLLTs could work with businesses that are starting to provide 
legal services online so that physical access becomes even less of an issue, 
considering that many in Washington report that there are not enough 
lawyers easily and conspicuously available to meet their needs.228 
Initiatives like APR 28 could disrupt how legal professionals provide 
services and accordingly make legal assistance more widely available for 
those with lower incomes. LLLTs teaming up with other non-lawyers 
could innovate legal service delivery models that save costs, broaden 
access to legal assistance physically and psychologically, and inspire 
critical thought about the role that advocates play in counseling clients. 
For example, are humans actually necessary to advise people on their civil 
legal needs, or can artificially intelligent technology provide the same or 
better counsel? If counsel adds value through human touch—simply 
making clients feel heard, artfully negotiating with opposing counsel, or 
respectfully representing the matter to a court—should LLLT models or 
like initiatives take this into account? Is legal counsel from a human source 
a necessity or a luxury good? Could non-lawyer innovations offer 
solutions to provide the legal assistance that is, in fact, necessary? 
In any case, with only one Candidate expressing an interest in 
potentially pursuing work with a business outside of the legal field, the 
initial LLLT cohorts do not appear anxious to leverage these possibilities 
to decrease costs to the point that services are widely affordable for those 
with a low income.229 
3. Substantial Pursuit of Private Sector Work in Law Firms and in Solo 
Practice 
LLLTs and Candidates appear primed to pursue work for law firms 
or in solo practice. No fewer than 33 of the 36 respondents planned to 
either work for a firm or start her own LLLT practice, with some still 
planning to work with law firms for space, referrals, or other resources 
even when they are on their own.230 Of those individuals, the majority—
24 participants—anticipated the possibility of working for a law firm, 4 of 
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whom expected to work exclusively for a firm.231 The vast majority—30 
participants—contemplated opening up their own solo practice.232 In 
contrast, of those planning to work for a law firm, only 4 also planned to 
work for a public sector entity (non-profit, government office, or 
courthouse) among other options.233 
a. Work at Law Firms 
The previous Section discussed in detail why the LLLT model will 
mimic rather than alter the pricing issues that lawyers face. That the 
majority of LLLTs and Candidates indicate they will work at a law firm 
as one of their options provides further evidence of this. Even if LLLTs 
will charge lower prices than lawyers at their firms, they will still have to 
charge enough to make it worth the firms’ while. 
LLLTs and Candidates acknowledge this. One LLLT explained that 
the point of the LLLT model is “really to allow poor people to get 
services,” and “not to make your firm more money,” but at the same time 
she noted that “that can be one of the options—existing firms to hire legal 
technicians and offer that service.”234 As mentioned earlier, charging $500 
to less wealthy clientele to do all of their divorce papers might “look[] 
pretty good,” but that might still require these clients to ask for help from 
family or by paying in installments.235  
For LLLTs working at firms, her comments suggest at least two 
hurdles in helping low-income consumers. First, law firms set rates high 
enough to make a case profitable. Let’s say a firm charges $1,000 total to 
help with a family law case—a conservative estimate given that the 
median total that LLLTs plan to charge hovers around $1,000.236 One 
thousand dollars is probably a lot of money to someone living under 200% 
of the federal poverty line.237 Even if a client hired an LLLT at a firm to 
take their case at such a rate, if the client is supposed to pay with the help 
of family or a payment plan then the LLLT and firm must rely on tenuous 
strategies to get paid. Such clients may default on their ability to pay, and 
even if they can find the funds to pay the firm, they might take on debt to 
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another source to do so. If they would have a difficult time making 
payments to the firm, borrowing the money from another source does not 
necessarily solve their ability to afford the services (unless the source can 
either provide a lower interest rate or does not ultimately require that 
person to pay back the loan in its entirety). Either way, the LLLT rate at 
the firm may make legal services more affordable relative to lawyers, but 
that does not make services affordable to those for whom $500 is a lot of 
moneylikely including many of those in the low-income populations 
identified by the Civil Legal Needs studies.238 
If a potential client could not afford such an amount for their legal 
questions, of course, this calls into question whether law firms will find it 
worth their while to let LLLTs serve low-income consumers at a reduced 
fee. One LLLT, who started at a firm as a paralegal and transitioned to 
LLLT work after she obtained her license, explained that the hourly rate 
she planned to charge might fluctuate based on the firm’s needs: “The 
concern is just seeing how the year goes and how it benefits the firm itself, 
you know what I mean, the costs and whatnot.”239 Even with a firm open 
to supporting its employee’s shift from paralegal to LLLT, the opportunity 
is still conditioned upon how it benefits the firm. If her case is any 
indication, law firms may be open to experimenting with the new clientele 
and revenue that LLLTs can bring in, but firms still must run their business 
as a business and keep an eye on the bottom line. Reasonably, this would 
mean only taking on the cases of those who can afford to pay fees high 
enough to employ an LLLT while sustaining profit margins wide enough 
to justify their time. 
To this end, another LLLT recognized the need for her firm to charge 
sustainably high prices even when all she wanted to do was help people at 
a reduced rate: 
Because I work for this firm, I’m dictated by the firm policies and 
things like that, so I would have to ask the attorney [to lower prices]. 
I’m one that goes, “Can we lower the fees, so this person can afford 
it?” or, “Can we do it for this much for this?” I would try to work 
with the client.240 
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She wanted to start her own practice after working with the firm for 
a while as an LLLT but admitted that working for a firm could help her 
keep an eye on the bottom line. “If I had my own office, I don’t know if I 
would be very good, because I would want to do everything for free.”241 
Even for someone so motivated to adjust her prices in order to make her 
services accessible to potential clients regardless of their financial 
background, she acknowledges that private practice needs to charge high 
enough rates to stay afloat. 
Accepting this, there is no reason to think that LLLTs’ work at law 
firms would stretch to cover low-income clients, save for taking on a few 
pro bono cases where they can. 
b. Work in Solo Practice 
Similar challenges beset those who intend to open their own practice. 
As discussed previously, LLLTs will still need to charge enough to cover 
the overhead for their practices.242 Like the LLLT who “would want to do 
everything for free” at her firm, the same pricing considerations apply for 
those who wish they could help individuals who do not have the resources 
to pay for legal assistance: “I have the kind of personality that wants to 
just give it away. Obviously, I can’t do that. I can’t pay my business 
expenses and not have some income as well.”243 As another stated: 
I don’t know what it would benefit someone to prepare documents 
and do specific things if they’re not at least charging a wage that they 
could survive on. I don’t know, to be honest with you, how I would 
personally do it. . . . Helping people is just a—it’s the fun part, you 
know?244 
If even the LLLTs whose hearts bleed say that helping people is “the 
fun part” and that they will still need to charge rates sufficient to cover 
costs, the model does not give much hope that those who plan to open their 
own practice—the majority of the initial cohorts—will be able to charge 
prices low enough to serve low-income clients. 
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Moreover, at least some LLLTs expect to earn a decent or better 
living through developing their own practice. One projected that she would 
have no trouble covering the taxes incurred for her practice because “given 
the amount that I anticipate making . . . I’ll make a decent living. I know 
that.”245 Another acknowledged: 
I don’t see this as something that I would become rich off of, but I 
would certainly be able to have a comfortable life because, as a 
paralegal, I have a decent life, you know what I mean?. . . I would 
hope that I would continue to maintain the lifestyle I have now.246 
What it means to make a “decent living” and maintain “a comfortable 
life” vary widely, but at least for these individuals, it suggests earning a 
median income of about $60,000 a year and perhaps a high annual income 
of $95,000 or more.247 Such expectations do not suggest that LLLTs 
opening their own practice could afford to take on very many low-income 
clients. 
Low-income clients may thus fall by the wayside. As one LLLT put 
it, “[C]learly, there are lots of people who need help and don’t have any 
money. But we also can’t give our services away when we have overhead 
and insurance to pay for, and we need to feed ourselves.”248 She thought 
that she would probably serve clients on the lower end of the financial 
spectrum through “low bono work,” where LLLTs would “take on a 
certain amount of cases at a lower rate.” 249 LLLTs and Candidates have 
been encouraged through their training to pursue pro bono and low bono 
work.250 However, as this LLLT pointed out: “[I]f someone truly doesn’t 
have any money, they’re going to have a hard time affording any kind of 
legal services, which I know this program is hoping to remedy. I’m not 
sure exactly how they’re going to meet the needs of people with absolutely 
no money.”251 
To open their own practice, LLLTs and Candidates recognize that 
they only have so many hours in the day. As discussed above, some 
express skepticism at using flat fee structures because cases risk becoming 
blooming onions where the number of hours starts to multiply as the legal 
or interpersonal complexity grows unwieldy.252 Most of those who 
anticipate starting a practice at some point in their LLLT career indicate 
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that they expect to make a moderate income by federal poverty guideline 
standards (somewhere between $47,700 and $95,400 per year for a 
household of four). A little more than half plan to serve somewhere 
between 1 to 15 clients per month, while the others expect to serve more 
than 15 clients monthly. 
 




                                                     
 253. See CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2015, supra note 13, at 11. 
 Note: Many responders did not have an estimate for future earning, with 16 responding saying 
they don’t know, or not providing a response. 
Fig. 7: When asked how much they planned to earn as LLLTs, of those who responded, LLLTs and 
Candidates most often reported that they thought they would make at least $47,700 per year, which 
would be enough to sustain a moderate-income household (over 200% FPL) for a household of 
four according to the 2014 federal poverty guidelines. 
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Figure 8 – LLLTs and Candidates Project They Will Serve Between 
1–30 Clients Per Month 
 
 
Accordingly, on the low end of the spectrum, LLLTs and Candidates 
most often expect that they will make roughly $3,975 per month, which 
would require them to charge each client about $265, assuming they serve 
and close 15 client cases per month. For those with a low income, of 
course, $265 can still be a lot of money (or even insurmountable), even if 
the rate is reasonable compared to lawyers’ fees.254 But this calculation 
also assumes that all fees go to the LLLT’s income and that her practice 
incurs zero costs, which will not be the case. Practically speaking, at these 
rates LLLTs would be hard pressed to earn the salaries they expect while 
taking on low-income clients more often than the occasional pro bono or 
low bono case. In this sense, LLLTs’ anticipated attempts at solo practice 
would mirror some of the same challenges that solo practitioner lawyers 
face, and because of that their prices may mirror each other, too.255 At that 
rate, as one skeptic has put it, “Why hire a ‘lawyer lite’ when you can just 
hire a lawyer?’”256 
                                                     
 254. See supra Section II.A; supra fig.2; supra fig.3. 
 255. See Granat, supra note 48. 
 256. Aprile, supra note 44, at 229 (quoting Jerry Moberg & Greg McLawsen, Is There a Case 
for Bringing LLLTs Into a Firm?, NWLAWYER, Nov. 2015, at 20, 22, http://nwlawyer.wsba.org/ 
Fig. 8: When asked how many clients they planned to serve each month, LLLTs and Candidates most 
often responded that they would serve somewhere between 1 to 30 clients. Many respondents did not 
venture an estimate, with nine of those asked saying that they do not know, that the number would vary 
too widely to estimate, or not providing a response.  
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To that end, some LLLTs and Candidates have mentioned that they 
would like to use a sliding scale fee structure for their practice, but LLLTs’ 
limited scope calls into question whether such a business model could be 
tenable. One LLLT reported that she would be “willing to adjust [the fee] 
in situations depending on if it’s a low income client.”257 On the other end 
of the financial spectrum, another ventured: “[I]f you get a reputation for 
quality work, I don’t think that it’s absolutely confined, your work, to the 
lower income bracket or the moderate-income bracket.” 258 She elaborated: 
“[Lower income individuals affording services is] always a struggle. There 
is the possibility of offering a sliding fee scale.”259 
Yet she also cautioned that offering a sliding scale “would be 
dependent upon generating enough of the full-paying clients that you 
could afford to do that.”260 Realistically, she was not sure that she would 
earn enough to do so: 
Until I know what my clientele is and what kind of income I can 
generate, it’s hard for me to say right off the bat that I can do that. I 
would definitely want to include that in my ideal practice that I could 
do a sliding scale fee depending on people’s incomes.261 
Indeed, LLLTs cannot handle cases that entail more complicated 
property matters.262 
[I]f someone has a business and they have a lot of assets and they 
have certain things, they, rightfully so, should go to an attorney 
because there’s a lot of particulars that are involved in that process, 
and there are rules that protect them. I can’t do certain things that an 
attorney can do, such as distribution of real property and the 
disbursement of retirement income through a separate order . . . .263 
Since APR 28 precludes LLLTs from assisting higher-net individuals 
who invest, hold pensions, or own property, their restricted ability to work 
                                                     
nwlawyer/november_2015?pg=22#pg22 [https://perma.cc/PE3D-924Q]). 
 257. See LLLT Interview 003. 
 258. See LLLT Interview 010. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See APR 28 REG. 2(B)(3)(c). The rule’s regulations preclude LLLTs from advising or 
assisting clients who are going through a divorce to divide real estate, formal business entities, or 
retirement assets. The proposed amendments to APR 28 and its regulations would allow LLLTs to 
advise and assist with the distribution of real property that is a “single family residential dwelling with 
owner equity less than or equal to twice the homestead exemption.” Draft Suggested Amendments, 
APR 28, supra note 27; see also APR 28 REG. 2(B)(3)(b). The proposed changes would also allow for 
their limited assistance with retirement funds. See Draft Suggested Amendments, APR 28, supra note 
27; APR 28 REG. 2(B)(3)(c)–(d). 
 263. See LLLT Interview 007. 
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with those on the other side of the wealth curve will also restrict their 
ability to take on clients who can subsidize fees for lower-income clients. 
As one LLLT put it, “We can’t even help people who have real 
property . . . so it’ll be hard for [our clients] to have liquid assets that they 
can use,” and because of that “it’s gotta be lower-income to medium[-
income]” clients that they would help.264 As such, the model as designed 
curbs the feasibility of LLLTs offering sliding scale fee structures in their 
practice and inhibits another potential approach to sustainably serving 
low-income clients. 
* * * 
All of this has yet to mention the lingering possibility that LLLTs, 
practicing solo or within a firm, still must refer their clients to attorneys 
should the complexity of the case spill over their limited scope.265 LLLTs 
are well aware of the possibility: 
I’ll have clients that get to a point where, wait a minute, I can’t help 
you with this. We need to get you connected with an attorney who 
can advise you how to do this. Or advise you, you can make the 
decision, and then I can carry out that lawyer’s instructions.266 
Even if necessary, “[i]t’s kind of cost prohibitive for the client to pay 
this attorney to figure out what’s going on. You know, to go and argue,” 
one LLLT explained.267 She said that she and her employer, a firm, were 
“trying to figure out how [they] can work together . . . [on] some sort of 
business model so that [she has] an attorney available to argue things.”268 
They were floundering to find a way to make the transition both worth the 
attorney’s time and affordable to the client: “Right now we’re just really 
not seeing how it’s going to work like that.”269 Another LLLT struggled to 
discern the same: 
There’s challenges that are presented by the rules of professional 
conduct. . . . I mentioned one about how LLLTs are not allowed to 
advise or assist in the division of real property. That, and also the 
division of business entities and the division of certain retirement 
funds. So, that creates a challenge, because it will be an added cost 
                                                     
 264. See LLLT Interview 011. 
 265. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 21, at 617 (explaining that LLLTs learn materials 
beyond the scope of what they can advise so that they discern the boundary of their limited scope and 
can refer the client to a lawyer at that point). 
 266. See LLLT Interview 013. 
 267. See LLLT Interview 003. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. 
2018] Law by Non-Lawyers 57 
for my client to refer him or her to . . . [an] attorney. . . . That part I 
don’t think works very well or will work very well . . . .270 
Even if the property distribution limitation may only affect higher-
income clients,271 LLLTs’ limited scope could also affect lower income 
clients in the case of, say, a contentious divorce, custody battle, or 
restraining order where the client needs a counselor to represent her in 
court or in negotiation with opposing counsel.272 The outstanding 
possibility that an LLLT would need to refer a case to a more expensive 
attorney only adds doubt that the LLLT model would solve this aspect of 
the access to justice dilemma. 
Granted, the initial cohort of LLLTs attracted many paralegals, 
perhaps even a disproportionate amount. Of the LLLTs interviewed, 14 of 
15 reported previously or currently working as a paralegal.273 Of the 
Candidates surveyed,274 15 of 21 reported working previously or currently 
as a paralegal.275 The insights of those interviewed therefore could skew 
towards those who have worked or currently work as a paralegal in a law 
firm,276 which could bias the models and prices they anticipate using in 
their LLLT work toward those with which they are familiar. The shift 
suggests that later cohorts may attract a wider diversity of professional 
backgrounds from candidates, which could also mean that they start with 
clean slates that remain open to a more creative approach to law if their 
expectations have not been colored with existing approaches. 
At the same time, for both initial cohorts, so few report looking to 
opportunities in the public sector or businesses outside of law relative to 
the vast majority who anticipate working at a law firm or opening up their 
own practice. Consequently, nearly all the initial LLLTs plan to seek work 
that would be difficult to sustain without charging rates significant enough 
to cover business expenses and earn an income on top of that—rates that 
                                                     
 270. See LLLT Interview 008. 
 271. Low-income family law clients may not have the real property or financial assets that would 
require an LLLT to pass on their case to an attorney to deal with the property division under APR 28’s 
regulations. Nonetheless, it may be worth noting that there are lots of family law issues specific to 
low-income clients that can be difficult to navigate, for example the interplay of property division or 
maintenance settlements with disability or health insurance benefits, or the child support or birth 
expense guidelines used in cases that involve low-income parties. 
 272. See Aprile, supra note 44, at 231 (“In general, a legal representative who cannot 
communicate with an opposing party is of questionable value.”). 
 273. See LLLT Interviews 001–014. 
 274. Seventeen of those surveyed as “Candidates” for this study came into the model as part of 
the second cohort, and the other 4 started with the first cohort but had not yet passed the exam. See 
LLLT Surveys 1–21. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Of those interviewed and surveyed, most of those who said they previously or currently 
worked as a paralegal did or do so at a law firm. See LLLT Interviews 001–014; LLLT Surveys 1–21. 
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do not give reason to believe that the LLLT model will increase access to 
justice for those who can least afford it. 
C. The Motivations, Not Martyrdom, of LLLTs and Candidates 
The prices offered and sectors pursued reflect, or perhaps stem from, 
the motivations of LLLTs and Candidates seeking this licensing. Because 
LLLTs themselves will make the day-to-day choices about the work—
where, how, and which clients to target—they will shape the model by 
determining how it is carried out. Accordingly, their motives, values, and 
goals will shape the model, especially these initial cohorts. Like any 
institution touched by human hands, the motivations of the people who 
comprise it will knead the model into its ultimate form. The push of 
practitioners’ altruism and their instinct to leave a legacy against their pull 
of self-preservation and pursuit of happiness will shape the LLLT model 
as much as any institution or social solution. LLLTs bring the “why,” and 
as such, will bring the “how.” 
So, why? Why have these initial cohorts decided to pursue legal 
technician licensing? LLLTs and Candidates acknowledge their desire to 
improve their own quality of life alongside their desire to help others who 
cannot otherwise afford legal assistance. Consequently, LLLTs and 
Candidates recognize the limitations they face in serving those who cannot 
afford to pay, and instead plan to focus primarily on those clients who can 
afford to sustain their practices. In other words, even for LLLTs and 
Candidates aspiring to serve those who can least afford legal services, the 
need to balance caring for others with caring for self and family leads them 
to accept and admit that, at the core of their practice, they will not be able 
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Figure 9 – LLLTs and Candidates Are Less Motivated to Serve 
Those Who Cannot Afford to Pay Anything277 
 
                                                     
 277. Responses include both responses from closed-ended survey questions (where Candidates 
were asked whether listed motivations were very important, important, or not important) and open-
ended interview questions (where LLLTs were asked what motivated them to become LLLTs without 
a list of potential reasons). The figure combines responses by including survey respondents who listed 
a motivation as “very important” and interview participants who mentioned a particular motivation, 
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Figure 10 – Most LLLTs and Candidates Think They Will Make 
More Money Working as an LLLT 
 
1. Quality of Life and Work 
To improve their quality of life and work, LLLTs and Candidates are 
not necessarily looking to make more money but to grow professionally 
and gain flexibility in their schedules. The majority expected to make more 
money as an LLLT than they would have otherwise.278 Most said that 
heightening their earning potential was important.279 However, more often 
                                                     
 278. See supra fig.10. 
 279. See supra fig.9. 
Fig. 9: When asked how important these motivations were for LLLTs and Candidates deciding to 
become LLLTs, they most often responded that they wanted to serve those who could not afford a 
lawyer but could afford to pay something, to expand access to justice in family law, and to 
challenge themselves professionally. A significant minority of respondents reported wishing to 
serve those who cannot afford to pay anything, just a few more than those who were motivated to 
serve those who can afford to pay for an attorney but prefer to work with an LLLT. 
Fig. 10: When asked how they thought their earnings as an LLLT would compare to their earnings before 
becoming an LLLT, respondents most frequently indicated that they thought they would make more or 
much more than they would earn otherwise. Others thought they would make about the same, and a few 
believed they would make less, demonstrating that LLLTs and Candidates plan to work with clients who 
can sustain this level of salary.  
3 16 8 2 2
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
How LLLTs and Candidates Think Their Income as an LLLT Will 
Compare to Income Otherwise
(n = 31, single responses)
Much 
More





2018] Law by Non-Lawyers 61 
than not, participants did not report this as a key motivating factor. Most 
felt similarly about job stability and professional mobility: important, but 
not very important. 
More so, LLLTs and Candidates want to take control of their 
professional life. The opportunity to challenge themselves provided a key 
motivation for all but a handful of the participants.280 As one put it, her 
current job demanded much from her physically while she knew she was 
not “living up to [her] potential.”281 Further, most said that expanding legal 
services in family law provided a very important source of their 
motivation, indicating some sense of aspiring to leave their mark on the 
profession or help others in a moment of need. And almost half offered—
without prompting, suggesting its significance—that greater flexibility 
and control of their own schedule served as a motivator. One wanted to be 
able to take Fridays off.282 Another wanted to make more money working 
while spending less time as she prepared for retirement.283 Another 
explained that becoming an LLLT would allow her to fulfill her desire to 
help others while being there for her kids: 
[I]t’s hard to balance wanting to help others while making sure that 
my own children are, like, I don’t want [them] to sacrifice what they 
have of me while I’m helping other people. So, this is why I felt it 
was a good balance where I could do something that I love, help 
people.284 
While such motivations do not preclude serving low-income clients, 
they may help to explain or reinforce LLLTs’ focus on serving those from 
more moderate means since such clients may be more willing and able to 
pay the kind of prices that facilitate working fewer hours and taking more 
days off. 
2. Focus on Moderate Means 
On the whole, regardless of how much LLLTs and Candidates want 
to expand family law legal services or gain agency in their schedules and 
professional development, they acknowledge that they are more inclined 
to serve those with a moderate income. When asked what type of financial 
background they thought their clients would have, all but a few indicated 
that they anticipated serving clients with a moderate income.285 
                                                     
 280. See supra fig.9. 
 281. See LLLT Interview 005. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See LLLT Interview 010. 
 284. See LLLT Interview 014. 
 285. See supra fig.9; supra fig.11. This Article defines “moderate income” for participants as 
somewhere between $23,340 and $46,680 per year for an individual, or between $47,700 and $95,400 
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Figure 11 – Only a Few LLLTs Plan to Focus Exclusively on 
Working with Low-Income Clients 
 
 
Compared to any other motivation, more LLLTs and Candidates 
reported that they were very motivated to become LLLTs to expand legal 
services to those who cannot afford a lawyer but can afford to pay 
something. In contrast, expanding legal services to those who cannot 
afford a lawyer and cannot afford to pay anything was one of the least 
important motivations for LLLTs and Candidates. Overall, most LLLTs 
and Candidates found that increasing their earning potential, challenging 
themselves, stabilizing their job security, and catalyzing their professional 
mobility provided more motivation than serving those who could not 
                                                     
per year for a household of four, based on the Census Bureau’s Federal Poverty Level rates upon which 
the 2015 Civil Legal Needs Study relied. See CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2015, supra note 13, at 11. 
Fig. 11: When asked what kind of financial backgrounds they expected their clientele to have, almost all 
LLLTs and Candidates planned to serve moderate-income clients, and almost three times as many 
planned to target moderate-income clients exclusively compared to those who planned to focus 
exclusively on working with low-income clients. Most frequently, respondents reported that they planned 
to work with both low- and moderate-income clients.   
Note: Low income is defined as less than $23,339 per year for an individual, or less than $47,699 for a 
household of four; ** Moderate income is defined as between $23,340 and $46,680 per year for an 
individual, or between $47,700 and $95,400 per year for a household of four; ^ High income is defined 
as at least $46,681 per year for an individual, or at least $95,401 per year for a household of four.  
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afford to pay for legal services. How can we reconcile this with so many 
participants reporting that they wanted to become LLLTs because they 
aspire to promote access to justice?286 
Some LLLTs want to provide affordable legal services for those with 
moderate means because they think that population has even less access to 
legal services than low-income populations. One LLLT explained: 
There are very little resources that you could pass along the medium-
income people to. There was [sic] resources for really low-income 
people—although not much, but there were some. There’s really 
nothing that you can do to offer help for medium-income people, 
except maybe pass them on[] to an online self-help site or something 
like that. . . . It seemed like a no-brainer that if you have some 
knowledge of what [the family law] forms are and how the process 
works, you would be able to offer a service to these people without 
having to advise them on law . . . more or less telling them how to do 
stuff, helping them fill out forms. That kind of service didn’t seem to 
exist.287 
Another LLLT acknowledged that “critics of the program . . . said 
it’s not really going to help the problem of the unmet legal needs in our 
state,” but when she worked as a court facilitator providing assistance to 
pro se litigants, “several of the pro se that came in were not the very poor. 
They had jobs and could probably afford to pay something, just not what 
an attorney would charge.”288 For another, she looked around her 
neighborhood and saw a problem she could help to solve: 
[W]e live in a middle class neighborhood, and our office is just down 
the street from where we live. And so, we know that for most people 
they cannot afford to pay attorney’s fees of $300 or more, and they 
don’t necessarily need that. . . . So, we’ve just been in support of [the 
LLLT model] from the beginning because it makes sense, given the 
neighborhood that we live in, and what I know from my 
experience . . . .289 
Still another noted: 
I know this program is designed to meet the need of lower income 
people that maybe are unable to afford an attorney. After being in this 
business for a long time and seeing people from all walks of life, I 
really expect it to be a broader range than that. We have always gotten 
                                                     
 286. See, e.g., LLLT Interview 004. 
 287. See LLLT Interview 010. While this is true, it may be worth reiterating that organizations 
serving low-income legal consumers for free must still turn away huge numbers of potential clients 
each year due to lack of resources. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3. 
 288. See LLLT Interview 008. 
 289. See id. 
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phone calls at this office, on a fairly regular basis from people: Is 
there anybody there that can help me with these forms? . . . Trying to 
do things in the most economical way is not specific to the poverty 
level.290 
These LLLTs see a need affecting moderate-income legal consumers 
and an opportunity to solve it. 
Other LLLTs and Candidates have resolved that, ideals aside, they 
cannot afford to serve lower income clients. One LLLT explained: “I like 
the idea that [the LLLT model] sticks to, at least in theory: affording 
people who have limited access or no access to representation and the 
opportunity to have some help. That’s what appeals to me. I’ve always 
been the I-want-to-save-the-world kind of person.”291 Yet she went on to 
recognize: “Even though I passionately, naively believe in justice for all, 
it was kind of in conflict with, okay, how do you do that when you want 
to save the world but you want to make money?”292 She noted that the 
model “is supposed to be about affording people access to justice,” but 
when it comes down to it, “it really is about being able to practice in some 
way in the law. . . .”293 She conceded: 
There’s still going to be people out there who just can’t afford it at 
the end of the day. Especially with family law. You’re not going to 
fight about anything that’s more important than your family and your 
children. It’s so emotional that it’s an expensive area of law. I mean, 
it’s a good goal, but at the end of the day not everybody is going to 
be able to afford an LLLT even. There are going to continue to be 
people who have to appear in court with no clue about what’s going 
on and hope for the best.294 
She concluded: “There is no fix for access to justice.” 295  
At least, no quick fix. Another started her career in non-profit legal 
services and saw the purpose of the LLLT model as “really to allow poor 
people to get services.”296 At the same time, she expected that she would 
gross about $200,000 each year, so when she projected that her clients 
would come from moderate- and low-income backgrounds, she stopped 
herself: “I expect that most of them will be at or below federal poverty 
levelor, well, I shouldn’t say below.”297 Even those who want to save 
                                                     
 290. See LLLT Interview 010. 
 291. See LLLT Interview 006. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See LLLT Interview 001. 
 297. See id. 
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the world and agree that the LLLT model seeks to expand access to justice, 
including to low-income consumers, do not see how they can consistently 
serve these lower income clients. They want to “help people” and see their 
LLLT role as “a happy medium.”298 
Rather, those who see themselves working with low-income clients 
mostly intend to take on a case here or there or do pro bono work. One 
indicated that she would “be definitely committed to taking pro bono 
clients every once in a while.”299 One planned to start volunteering at local 
legal clinics and taking on referrals from attorneys for those who struggle 
to afford traditional legal counsel.300 Another volunteered at a family law 
legal clinic for those with low or no income once every six weeks.301 Yet 
these are exceptions. They occur at the margins. By and large, LLLTs do 
not plan to serve low-income clients in their practice.  
* * * 
Both the initial design of the LLLT scheme and these insights from 
the first cohorts raise doubts that the model can increase access to justice 
for low-income legal consumers. The LLLT model essentially mimics the 
aspects of the legal profession that keep lawyers’ prices artificially high, 
providing little reason to believe that LLLTs will lower prices enough to 
serve a meaningful number of low-income clients. Nor do LLLTs’ and 
Candidates’ initial career plans indicate they will reinvent conventional 
legal service delivery models. Most either plan to work for law firms 
charging rates lower than attorneys’ fees or open their own practice while 
keeping overhead low. Both paths still require LLLTs to charge rates high 
enough to bring in revenue to covers costs and sustain their wages. Neither 
route capitalizes on the unique opportunity for LLLTs to partner with 
industries and investors outside of law, an opportunity that does not exist 
for lawyers under the rule of professional conduct that prohibits profit-
sharing with non-lawyers. Nor does the LLLT model decrease the cost of 
legal professionals’ labor to the extent that government offices or non-
profit organizations could substantially expand the human capacity of their 
legal services absent an increase in funding for additional hires. And, while 
most of these LLLTs and Candidates decided to earn their license to 
expand access to justice in family law, they still predominantly intend to 
target clients who can afford to pay their rates—rates lower than attorneys’ 
fees but not low enough for low-income populations to afford. As such, 
the LLLT model does not give us reason to believe that it will lower the 
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cost of legal services so significantly that low-income populations will 
access justice through civil legal assistance any better than before. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
If Washington or other states hope to increase access to justice for 
their low-income populations with legal technicians, they should view the 
LLLT model as just that: a model. The design could be adapted a number 
of ways to increase access to justice beyond moderate-income consumers 
to those with lower incomes. 
Most narrowly, the model could provide more information to LLLTs 
about harnessing the potential of the market, prospective models, and their 
motivations. Without market research to analyze what customers across 
the economic spectrum would be willing and able to pay for their services, 
LLLTs and Candidates will continue to feel their way through the dark as 
they price their services. Even this Article can only assume what low- and 
moderate-income populations would be willing and able to pay for legal 
assistance from legal technicians without more precise information about 
how much people would actually pay. LLLTs need market research that 
provides more nuanced data about what their potential clients could afford 
so that they and their employers can set prices accordingly, perhaps even 
charging higher amounts to those who can withstand them in order to 
subsidize those who cannot afford as much, making their sliding scale 
ambitions come to life. 
The LLLT model could go even farther in training LLLTs to consider 
the possible permutations of their work. With richer training in business 
modeling and entrepreneurship, LLLTs could be more likely to consider 
and pursue more innovative legal service models, including partnerships 
with the finance, technology, or retail industries. This unique training may 
give LLLTs an edge that is not only marketable over their attorney 
competitors under professional ethics rules but could spark these pioneer-
minded legal professionals to dream up how they could realistically 
disrupt the industry to increase access to justice not only for moderate-
income consumers but for low-income populations as well. 
LLLTs acknowledge the potential direct impact of their work on 
clients, but the model’s training could delve more deeply into its potential 
systemic implications and potential to increase access to justice more 
broadly defined as social justice. Community paralegals, like those in 
Sierra Leone and other countries around the world, often use community-
based education and advocacy to complement their legal assistance work. 
This approach can attempt to shift power dynamics in the long run in order 
to expand low-income clients’ ability to access justice in a broader 
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sense.302 Including this as part of LLLTs’ training could provide legal 
technicians more substantive and procedural tools to explore how even 
limited time and resources can be invested in a way that allows LLLTs to 
play a greater role in shaping how low-income populations can better 
access justice in a holistic sense. 
Beyond possible revisions to its curriculum, as it evolves the LLLT 
model could facilitate more opportunities for stakeholders to consider or 
get together to workshop more innovative legal service delivery models. 
The model could bring LLLTs and leaders from the public sector and other 
industries together to catalyze the creation of LLLT positions beyond 
those at traditional law firms. Tech companies or larger corporations could 
brainstorm ways to work with LLLTs to disrupt the legal market, and non-
profits could look at why they might want to hire in-house advocates who 
can independently offer basic legal advice to clients. Some LLLTs might 
want to pursue work that allows them to further build their existing or 
nascent business skills. However, brokering opportunities for these actors 
to see if there are more ways to work together might give all of them a 
better shot at serving more clients, including low-income clients, while 
allowing them to capitalize on their strengths. Doing so could allow 
LLLTs to focus on what they are trained and generally most motivated to 
do: provide legal assistance that increases people’s access to justice in 
family law. 
The model could also develop more scholarship opportunities so that 
it attracts LLLTs and Candidates beyond those who can afford at the outset 
the time and money needed to pursue the training—in other words, beyond 
those who have a more stable financial situation themselves. By providing 
such scholarships, the model could encourage individuals from lower 
income backgrounds to pursue LLLT training, who might bring stronger 
motivations and more nuanced understanding of the challenges and 
solutions needed to better serve low-income clientele. 
Allowing LLLTs to appear in court, negotiate with opposing counsel, 
and handle some cases involving property division would also make it 
more plausible that a client could sign on upfront for the total cost of legal 
assistance without surprises on the back end when an LLLT says they need 
to refer the client to an attorney after all. Granting LLLTs these tools 
would not only provide their clients with a more comprehensive, seamless, 
                                                     
 302. Maru, supra note 159, at 440–42. It is worth noting that paralegals in Sierra Leone and 
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may also see this as their role on an individual basis, but the LLLT model does not appear to share this 
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and affordable experience but would also permit LLLTs a more complete 
suite of tools which, combined with their lower rates, could bring down 
the cost of lawyers with the rise of more analogous competitors, albeit still 
theoretically. The ability to better serve more clients with moderate- or 
high-income backgrounds, including real property owners, could help 
make it feasible for LLLTs to use sliding scale models because the fees 
from higher-earning, higher-paying clients could subsidize their cases for 
lower-income clients.303 Before they are licensed, lawyers do not 
necessarily receive training on appearing before a court or negotiating with 
opposing counsel, so there is no obvious reason why LLLTs would need 
this for the sake of their legal competencies (though the model could offer 
such training if it would help courts and attorneys accept LLLTs as 
representatives). Likewise, while some LLLTs may not have the necessary 
skills to practice on thornier legal questions like those involving the 
division and distribution of property during a divorce, the model could 
always add training and assessment for licensing those LLLTs who would 
be willing and able to practice on those issues, rather than categorically 
excluding them. Washington’s model has begun to move for such 
amendments to the rules governing LLLT practice,304 but unless those 
changes come to light, these regulatory hurdles will continue to make 
LLLTs struggle to earn enough revenue to invest in taking on more low-
income clients. 
These implications play with the model at the margins. The LLLT 
model underlines the limitations of the legal profession as a whole to 
provide justice to those who can least afford it. To transform the legal 
market so that low-income clients can afford to access justice, the legal 
profession and the legal system require more systemic reforms than any 
legal paraprofessional model alone can provide. 
The legal profession’s exclusion of non-lawyers from sharing profits 
with its members closes off opportunities to leverage the skills, capital, 
and innovations that could come from partnering with other industries like 
finance, technology, or retail. Easing regulations on attorneys forming 
these relationships could allow for collaboration that creates whole new 
norms for delivering legal services.305 A company like Wal-Mart or 
Amazon could find a way to deliver high-volume legal services at the 
lowest possible cost through improving delivery systems that rely more on 
                                                     
 303. See Aprile, supra note 44, at 237 (citing Carolyn Elefant, Future Fridays: Will Limited 
Licensed Technicians Kill Solos & Smalls?, MYSHIGNLE (Sept. 27, 2013), http://myshingle.com/ 
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 304. See Draft Suggested Amendments, APR 28, REG. 2(B)(2)(b), supra note 27. 
 305. Chambliss, supra note 31, at 590. But see Robinson, supra note 11. 
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aggregate problem solving than on human capital. Increasing the 
availability of legal services in existing storefronts, like grocery stores, 
pharmacies, and shopping centers could increase the visibility and 
convenience of legal assistance, thus expanding access to justice to those 
with fewer resources. Like the advice centers in the United Kingdom306 
and South Africa,307 decreasing such barriers to legal consumers would 
address reasons that people in Washington have commonly cited for not 
being able to obtain legal services: physical distance and inconvenience.308 
Such models may even be able to respond more dynamically to the legal 
market than law firms alone could, which could ultimately catalyze 
innovations that close the justice gap.309 Closing the gap requires more 
than compressing the training and compensation of human capital, which 
promises to be expensive as long as it is done well. Even with lower 
educational and overhead costs, LLLTs still require not insignificant 
resources to operate—for their salary, their benefits, their malpractice 
insurance, and other expenses. For reasons outlined above, paying LLLTs 
a rate or salary lower than an attorney’s will not solve the issue. Public 
interest attorney salaries cannot dip much further as it is without failing to 
pay a living wage. In fact, some LLLTs seek remuneration above the 
average salary of some public interest attorneys. Even LLLTs who accept 
a lower wage or salary are not positioned to accept income so low that a 
government office or non-profit would be able to hire multiple LLLTs to 
replace a single attorney. Expanding legal assistance to low-income clients 
requires new solutions based in technology and self-help resources where 
services can be duplicated many times over at minimal cost to make it 
feasible to match demand for civil legal assistance with supply. Doing so 
may require regulatory changes that allow for innovations across 
industries, given that such disruptions have been slow to come to the legal 
profession as yet.310 
On top of these regulatory issues, another persists: the state 
monopoly on power. The legal profession’s reliance on the state monopoly 
over power in society means that it also must rely on the state’s monopoly 
                                                     
 306. See Moorhead et al., supra note 44, at 772–73, 75. 
 307. Maru, supra note 159, at 466. 
 308. CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2003, supra note 12, at 8–9 (reporting that some low-income 
respondents did not know where to turn for legal assistance and/or had less success in or access to 
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 310. See, e.g., CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2003, supra note 12, at 51 (“Technology is often 
described as the next frontier for the delivery of civil legal assistance.”); Zachary Hill & D. James 
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over justice—what justice means, where it happens, how to pursue it, why 
to pursue it, and of course, who can pursue it. As Hadfield discusses, the 
state’s monopoly on power keeps legal assistance prices high. The 
specific, complicated ways of pursuing formal justice mean that only a 
certain number of professionals can help people to navigate the complexity 
of the system. Legal professionals can charge accordingly.311 Not so if you 
further decentralize and de-monopolize the power. In that case, other 
actors, including more general lay advocates can move into the space and 
offer less expensive, perhaps even more effective, solutions. On its face, 
the state’s monopoly on power and justice may seem an immutable 
constant. Yet models exist to challenge this norm, and their acceptance is 
growing. Take for example the alternative community-based dispute 
resolution techniques employed by community paralegals in places like 
Sierra Leone or South Africa.312 Legal paraprofessionals in those 
communities can help clients resolve matters without relying on or ever 
encountering a formal justice system that may leave either or both parties 
feeling small, disrespected, and unheardas if justice, after all, has not 
been served. Community-based mechanisms can explore solutions 
relevant to both parties that may be otherwise off the table in the limited 
realm of remedies offered by the formal justice system. Less formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms could even account for the power 
differentials between parties and apply laws more equitably than equally, 
and unevenly, in the way formal courts often must and do.313 LLLTs 
trained in mediation or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
could offer more desirable solutions to clients who wish to avoid the 
courtroom, particularly to any low-income clients who have had prior 
experiences with the formal justice system that have left them feeling 
marginalized or even traumatized. Until the legal system truly accounts 
for the perspectives of low-income parties—including whether they buy 
into an outcome when they walk away from the formal justice system, 
depending on whether they feel that justice has been served based on their 
experience—the LLLT model can only do so much to close the justice gap 
in the broadest sense. 
Short of such changes, the model’s limitations bolster the argument 
for the continued public and private funding of legal aid in its many 
forms—non-profit organizations, law school clinics, and so on. Even with 
the LLLT model, low-income legal consumers will still have to turn to 
legal aid or pro bono attorneys to obtain free legal services. If the costs 
needed to sustain such services remain the same, the money to fund legal 
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assistance for low-income populations must come from somewhere in 
order to move closer to closing the justice gap. 
We cannot fault the LLLT model for these underlying and 
overarching limitations. An idea needs to start somewhere, and this first 
such iteration in the United States of an independent legal paraprofessional 
who can give legal advice could only take on so much at first. The model 
must tread lightly to gain credibility and momentum, as it already 
challenges the legal profession in its current form. Perhaps when the LLLT 
model more firmly establishes itself, it can consider further reforms like 
these to better ensure access to justice for all, including those with a low 
income. Until then, the LLLT model’s overall acceptance of the legal 
system and profession underscores the reason to question whether the 
model can extend justice to those least able to afford it, both in terms of 
legal assistance and in terms of justice more broadly defined. 
CONCLUSION 
The LLLT model is not designed to increase access to justice to low-
income legal consumers, an objective of the model that has been 
anticipated by many of its initial stakeholders and observers.314 LLLTs and 
Candidates tell us this through original research gathered for this Article 
about the rates LLLTs plan to charge, the jobs and service delivery models 
they plan to pursue, the motivations that drive them to attain their 
licensing, and ultimately the financial profiles of the clientele they intend 
to target. Charging an estimated total of $1,000 per case, LLLTs will 
pursue their motivations to expand access to justice in family law, 
primarily serving moderate-income individuals who can afford to pay such 
fees and sustain LLLTs’ law firm and solo practices. Save for exceptions, 
low-income legal consumers do not stand to benefit from the LLLT model 
as designed. 
LLLTs’ and Candidates’ insights confirm and grow out of the 
structural components of the legal technician model that mimic those of 
the legal profession as a wholethe factors originally identified by Gillian 
Hadfield as the reasons for attorneys’ artificially high prices: the continued 
complexity and unpredictability of the cases LLLTs will handle; the state’s 
continued monopoly over LLLTs’ licensing; and the homogenous nature 
of the skills valued and offered by the legal profession, LLLTs and lawyers 
alike. The LLLT model lowers the upfront costs, education, and 
examination requirements as barriers to entry into the legal profession, but 
the model still functions within and perpetuates the other aspects of the 
profession that raise legal costs for consumers. 
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Going forward, Washington and other states considering licensing 
schemes like the LLLT model could better aim to meet the needs of low-
income legal consumers by more substantially reimagining the breadth 
and depth of training LLLTs can attain, the opportunities to innovate legal 
service delivery models, and the role LLLTs can play in the legal 
profession and society at large. 
This is not to say the LLLT model could not prove to be a valuable 
tool to increase access to justice. Far from it. If the model can increase 
access for moderate-income legal consumers who could not previously 
afford civil legal services to meet their needs, the model would do its part 
to close the justice gap. Indeed, the model and its architects have not 
claimed that the scheme ever intended to fully close the justice gap. Still, 
those who hope the model would increase access to justice for low-income 
consumers should temper their expectations. 
As the Washington experiment moves forward and we continue to 
study its possibilities and limitations, LLLTs give legal practitioners and 
scholars the chance to pause and ask why we regulate our profession the 
way we do—and whether we could regulate the profession such that one 
day there really can be justice for all. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY DETAILS 
The author conducted this original primary research in order to 
analyze how the LLLT model has begun to play out through the 
perspectives and responses of those closest to the work: those who have 
become or are working to become licensed as LLLTs. 
Prior to the study, Harvard University’s Institutional Review Board 
reviewed and approved the design, correspondence, interview questions, 
and other materials. The method distinguished between: (1) candidates 
who had taken and passed the LLLT bar exam (LLLTs or Group 1)315 and 
(2) candidates who had enrolled in classes to train to become LLLTs but 
either had not yet taken the exam or had taken the exam but not yet passed 
(Candidates or Group 2). Group 1, those who had passed the exam, 
included the following: those who had applied for and received their LLLT 
licenses; those who met all requisite criteria for LLLT licensing but had 
not yet applied for their LLLT licenses; and those who did not yet meet all 
requisite criteria for licensing (e.g., completing the 3,000 practice hours 
and obtaining malpractice insurance). Within Group 1, eight participants 
had earned their license by the point of their interview. Group 2 included 
the following: those who completed their classroom credits but had not yet 
passed the exam; those who completed their classroom credits but had not 
yet taken the exam; those who completed their core curriculum credits but 
not yet their practice area credits; those who enrolled and started earning 
classroom credits but had not yet completed their core curriculum or 
practice area credits. Within Group 2, four participants had taken the exam 
at the point of the survey but had not yet passed. 
The WSBA provided contact information for both groups after 
checking with the potential participants to ensure that anyone who did not 
wish to be contacted could opt-out of further communication. No potential 
participants opted out, although in an abundance of caution, the WSBA 
did not pass on the contact information for one potential participant when 
she had her e-mail away message active during the window when 
recipients could opt-out. Both groups received e-mails inviting them to 
participate in the study. The correspondence invited those in Group 1 to 
participate in a phone interview about an hour long and those in Group 2 
to take an online survey.316 Each group received an initial invitation and, 
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for those who did not initially respond, up to three follow-up invitations 
over the course of two weeks. Interviews were completed between mid-
November and mid-December 2015; online surveys were open from early 
to late November 2015. Participants were first asked for their informed 
consent about the minor risks of participating in the study and also for their 
birth year to attest to their age of majority. Participation was voluntary and 
respondents did not receive compensation for their time. However, as a 
token of appreciation, respondents were entered into a raffle from which 
one entry was drawn to receive a $50 Amazon gift card upon completion 
of the study. 
The author conducted interviews remotely using a telephone 
conferencing system. Interviews were not conducted anonymously, but 
respondents participated with the understanding that their answers would 
be kept anonymous in their further disclosure. The author coded each 
interview with a number and did not include direct identifying information 
even though, as participants were informed, a small risk remains that the 
combination of answers or quotes could be used indirectly to identify 
respondents. Answers shared here have been edited as best as possible to 
prevent such identification. 
Participants had the opportunity to give or decline permission for 
their telephone interview to be audio recorded. All participants gave their 
permission for audio recording, and these recordings were then 
transcribed. The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of a mix of 
open and closed pre-determined questions and follow-up questions as they 
arose. Sometimes questions were asked out of order, depending on the 
responses of the participant, and sometimes certain questions were not 
asked at all, again depending on the responses of the participant and time 
available. Participants could pause or stop the interview at any time and 
could also skip any questions that they did not want to answer. Surveys 
were administered online through the Qualtrics survey platform. Potential 
participants received an individualized link to take the survey. Online 
surveys were conducted anonymously. Each survey was coded with a 
number and, again, direct identifying information was not recorded with 
participants’ responses with the possible exception of the ability to 
determine someone’s identity indirectly from their responses. The surveys 
were structured, consisting of a mix of open and closed pre-determined 
questions. The survey asked the same questions to each participant in the 
same order. As for Group 1, participants were told that they could pause 
or stop the survey at any time and could also skip any questions that they 
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did not want to answer. Responses from both groups were recorded and 
later analyzed by the author. 
The sample consisted of the first two cohorts of LLLTs and 
Candidates, which were comprised of 53 total potential participants. Of 
the 52 potential participants following the WSBA’s initial outreach,317 
there were 17 in Group 1 (LLLTs) and 35 in Group 2 (Candidates). Of the 
potential participants, 15 of the 17 members of Group 1 participated in the 
study (88.2% response rate) and 21 of the 35 members of Group 2 
participated (60% response rate). Overall, 36 of the 52 members of both 
Groups 1 and 2 combined participated in the study (69.2% response rate). 
The responses provide valid and reliable insights given these rates and the 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The author used the below questions to survey LLLT Candidates and 
adapted substantially similar questions to interview LLLTs, varying based 
on the flow of the conversation and time permitted. Closed-ended 
questions in the survey with predetermined response options provided 
were generally asked as open-ended questions in the interviews.319 
 
Question Answer Options Provided (Surveys) 
1. Do I have your informed consent 
to proceed with this survey/interview? 
-Yes, I consent. 
-No, I do not consent. 
2. In order to take this survey, you must be 18 
years old or older. In what year were you born? 
-1925 or Before 
-All Years in Between Listed 
-1997 or After 
3. How did you find out about the opportunity to 
become a Limited License Legal Technician 
(“LLLT”)? (Check all that apply.) 
-Colleague at prior place of employment 





4. Before you started LLLT training, had you 
done any of the following? 
-Worked as a paralegal at a law firm 
-Worked as a paralegal at a non-profit, 
government office, or courthouse 
- Worked in a non-paralegal role (e.g. legal 
assistant) at a law firm 
- Worked in a non-paralegal role (e.g. legal 
assistant) at a non-profit, government office, or 
courthouse 
- Ran a business 
-Wrote a business plan  
5. Do you have any prior experience with family 
law? (Check all that apply.) 
-Yes – Professional Experience 
-Yes – Personal Experience 
-No 
6. How important are the following motivations 
in your decision to become an LLLT? 
-Very Important 
-Important 
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-Higher Earning Potential 
-Job Stability 
-Professional Mobility 
-Earning Lawyers’ Respect 
-Challenging Myself 
-Not Important 
7. How important are the following motivations 
in your decision to become an LLLT? 
-Expanding legal services to family law 
-Expanding legal services to those who CAN 
afford a lawyer, but prefer an LLLT 
-Expanding legal services to those who 
CANNOT afford a lawyer, but CAN pay 
something 
-Expanding legal services to those who 





8. Is there anything else that motivated you to 
become an LLLT? 
-No 
-Yes – Please Explain [Open Text] 
9. As of today, how easy or challenging do you 
expect that it will be to pursue these motivations 






10. Why do you think it will be challenging to 
pursue these motivations? (Check all that 
apply.) (If applicable) 
-I have prior experience to draw upon. 
-The need to earn an income will limit the 
clients and purpose I can have. 
-The class credit requirements will make it 
difficult to obtain my LLLT license. 
-The apprenticeship hour requirement will 
make it difficult to obtain my LLLT license. 
-It will take awhile for potential clients to 
understand the concept and value of LLLTs. 
-It will take awhile for potential employers to 
understand the concept and value of LLLTs. 
-It will take awhile for the legal profession to 
understand the concept and value of LLLTs. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
11. Why do you think it will be easy or very easy 
to pursue these motivations? (Check all that 
apply.) (If applicable) 
-I do not have prior experience to draw upon. 
-I can serve the clients and purpose I want to 
serve while earning enough money. 
-The class credit requirements will not make it 
difficult to obtain my license. 
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-The apprenticeship hour requirement will not 
make it difficult to obtain my license. 
-The concept and value of LLLTs will easily 
catch on with potential clients. 
-The concept and value of LLLTs will easily 
catch on with potential employers. 
-The concept and value of LLLTs will easily 
catch on with the legal profession. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
12. Have you ever wanted to be an attorney? -Yes – and I still want to be an attorney. 
-Yes – but I no longer want to be an attorney. 
-No 
13. Do you think that becoming an LLLT will 




14. Why don’t you want to be an attorney? (If 
applicable) 
-I do not see the purpose if I can be an LLLT 
or paralegal. 
-I do not want to go through that much school. 
-I do not want to take on that much debt. 
-I do not think it is for me. 
-I do not think I would be qualified. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
15. Where do you think you will work as an 
LLLT? (Check all that apply.) 
-A law firm where I worked previously 
-A law firm where I have not worked 
previously 
-A non-profit organization 
-A government office 
-A courthouse 
-A business outside of the legal field 
-Starting my own practice 
-I have not given that much thought to where I 
might work. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
16. Where do you think you will work 
geographically? 
-In or around Seattle 
-Outside of Seattle – Where (if known)? [Open 
Text] 
-Multiple locations – Please Explain [Open 
Text] 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
17. What do you think your clients will be 
charged? 
-Hourly rate – How much (if you had to 
estimate)? [Open Text] 
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-Flat fee per case - How much (if you had to 
estimate)? [Open Text] 
-Depends on the case – Please Explain [Open 
Text] 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
18. What type of financial background do you 
think that your clients will have? (Check all that 
apply.) 
-Higher income (at least $46,681/year for an 
individual, or at least $95,0401 for a household 
of four) 
-Moderate income (between $23,340-
46,680/year for an individual, or between 
$47,700-95,400/year for a household of four) 
-Lower income (less than $23,339/year for an 
individual, or less than $47,699 for a 
household of four) 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
19. How much do you think you will earn as an 
LLLT?  
-At least $95,401/year 
-Between $47,700-95,400/year 
-Between $23,340-47,699/year 
-Less than $23,340/year 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
20. How do you think you will earn this amount? -Salary basis 
-Hourly basis 
-Fees-per-case basis 
-Depends – Please Explain [Open Text] 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
21. How does this income compare to what you 
could make without becoming an LLLT? 
-Much More 
-More 
-About the Same 
-Less 
-Much Less 
-Don’t Wish to Share 
22. How much do you think attorneys earn (on 
average in Washington state)? 
-At least $95,401/year 
-Between $47,700-95,400/year 
-Between $23,340-47,699/year 
-Less than $23,340/year 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
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23. At what stage are you in the LLLT licensing 
process? 
-Enrolled, but have not started earning 
classroom credits 
-Enrolled and started earning classroom 
credits, but have not yet completed them 
-Completed my classroom credits, but have not 
yet taken or passed the qualifying exam 
24. Were you able to satisfy your core 
curriculum credits before you started LLLT 
training? 
-Yes, all core curriculum credits 
-Yes, some core curriculum credits 
-No 
25. How easy or challenging did you expect it 
would be to complete your core curriculum 






26. How easy or challenging do you think it has 






-Not applicable – I have not yet completed 
enough of my core curriculum credits to say. 
27. Why do you think it has been easy or very 
easy to complete your core curriculum credits? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-My other work commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my core 
curriculum credits. 
-My personal commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my core 
curriculum credits. 
-My financial resources allow me the time I 
need to complete my core curriculum credits. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
28. Why do you think it has been challenging or 
very challenging to complete your core 
curriculum credits? (Check all that apply.) (If 
applicable) 
-My other work commitments interfere with 
the time I need to complete my core curriculum 
credits. 
-My personal commitments interfere with the 
time I need to complete my core curriculum 
credits. 
-My financial resources do not allow me the 
time I need to complete my core curriculum 
credits. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
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29. How easy or challenging did you expect it to 
be to complete your practice area credits, before 






30. How easy or challenging do you think it has 






-Not applicable – I have not yet completed 
enough of my practice area credits to say. 
31. Why do you think it has been easy or very 
easy to complete your practice area credits? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-My other work commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my practice 
area credits. 
-My personal commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my practice 
area credits. 
-My financial resources allow me the time I 
need to complete my practice area credits. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
32. Why do you think it has been challenging or 
very challenging to complete your core 
curriculum credits? (Check all that apply.) (If 
applicable) 
-My other work commitments interfere with 
the time I need to complete my practice area 
credits. 
-My personal commitments interfere with the 
time I need to complete my practice area 
credits. 
-My financial resources do not allow me the 
time I need to complete my practice area 
credits. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
33. As of today, how many apprenticeship hours 
have you completed? 
-All (3,000) 
-Most (Approximately 1,501 – 2,999) 
-Some (Approximately 1 – 1,500) 
-None (0) 
34. Of those hours, approximately how many 
did you complete prior to training to become an 
LLLT? 
-All (3,000) 
-Most (Approximately 1,501 – 2,999) 
-Some (Approximately 1 – 1,500) 
-None (0) 
35. How easy or challenging did you think it 
would be to complete your apprenticeship hours, 
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-Easy 
-Very Easy 
36. How easy or challenging do you think it will 






-Not applicable – I have not yet completed 
enough of my hours to say. 
37. Why do you think it has been easy or very 
easy to complete your apprenticeship hours? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-My other work commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my 
apprenticeship hours. 
-My personal commitments do not interfere 
with the time I need to complete my 
apprenticeship hours. 
-I receive or received payment for at least some 
of my apprenticeship hours. 
-My financial resources allow me the time I 
need to complete my apprenticeship hours. 
-I did not have trouble finding a place to 
apprentice. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
38. Why do you think it has been challenging or 
very challenging to complete your 
apprenticeship hours? (Check all that apply.) (If 
applicable) 
-I did not complete very many, or any, 
apprenticeship hours prior to enrolling to train 
to become an LLLT. 
-My other work commitments interfere with 
the time I need to complete my apprenticeship 
hours. 
-My personal commitments interfere with the 
time I need to complete my apprenticeship 
hours. 
-I do not receive, or have not received, 
payment for at least some of my apprenticeship 
hours. 
-My financial resources do not allow me the 
time I need to complete my apprenticeship 
hours. 
-I have had trouble finding a place to 
apprentice. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
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41. How easy or challenging do you think it will 






42. Why do you think the LLLT qualifying 
exam will be easy or very easy? (Check all that 
apply.) (If applicable) 
-My other work commitments will not 
interfere with the time I need to study. 
-My personal commitments will not interfere 
with the time I need to study. 
-My financial resources will allow me the time 
I need to study. 
-The classes will adequately prepare me. 
-The instructors will adequately prepare me. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
43. Why do you think the LLLT qualifying 
exam will be challenging or very challenging? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-The exam is designed to be challenging. 
-My other work commitments will interfere 
with the time I need to study. 
-My personal commitments will interfere with 
the time I need to study. 
-My financial resources will not allow me the 
time I need to study. 
-The classes will not adequately prepare me. 
-The instructors will not adequately prepare 
me. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
44. Why do you think the LLLT qualifying 
exam was challenging? (Check all that apply.) 
(If applicable) 
-The exam is designed to be challenging. 
-My other work commitments interfered with 
the time I needed to study. 
-My personal commitments interfered with the 
time I needed to study. 
-My financial resources did not allow me the 
time I needed to study. 
-The classes did not adequately prepare me. 
-The instructors did not adequately prepare 
me. 
-I do not think the exam was challenging. 
Please Explain [Open Text] 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
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45. Do you plan to take the LLLT qualifying 




46. Do you have a business plan? (If applicable) -Yes, I have a business plan. 
-Yes, I am working on making a business plan. 
-No, but I plan to make a business plan. 
-No, and I have no plans to make a business 
plan. 
47. How many clients do you expect to serve 





-Will vary too widely to approximate 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
48. How much time do you think you will spend 





-Less than 1 hour 
-Will vary too widely to approximate 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
49. How do you plan to meet potential clients? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-Referrals from law firms 
-Referrals from non-profits 
-Referrals from government offices 
-Referrals from courthouses 
-Referrals from non-law businesses (e.g. 
doctors, grocery stores) 
-Advertisements – Where (if known)? [Open 
Text] 
-Walk-In Traffic – From Where (if known)? 
[Open Text] 
50. What proportion of your earnings do you 
expect will go to pay taxes and business 





-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
51. Do you plan to have any of the following? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-An office 
-A clerical assistant 
-A copy machine 
-Health benefits 
-Paid leave benefits 
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52. How do you think you would pay for this? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-My own savings 
-Team up with a law firm 
-Team up with a non-profit 
-Team up with a non-law business 
-Small business loans 
-Investors 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
53. What will you do in the event that a client 
does not pay you? (Check all that apply.) (If 
applicable) 
-Follow up with the client by letter, phone, or 
e-mail 
-Refer the client to a debt collection agency 
-File a claim against the client 
-Depends on the case - Explain (if known) 
[Open Text] 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
54. Have you received, or do you plan to receive, 
payment for your apprenticeship hours? 
-Yes, for all of my hours 
-Yes, for some of my hours 
-No 
-Don’t Know 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
55. Is anyone helping you pay for your tuition 
while you train to become an LLLT? (Check all 
that apply.) 
-Spouse or Partner 
-Family member other than spouse/partner 
-Friend 
-No 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
-Don’t Wish to Share 
56. Is anyone helping you pay for your living 
expenses while you train to become an LLLT? 
(Check all that apply.) 
-Spouse or Partner 
-Family member other than spouse/partner 
-Friend 
-No 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
-Don’t Wish to Share 
57. Are you using any of the following to 
finance your educational or living expenses 
during your LLLT trainings? (Check all that 
apply.) 
-Scholarships (merit or need-based) 
-Grants (federal or school-based) 
-Private student loans 
-Federal (public) student loans 
-Personal income or savings 
-Don’t Know 
-Don’t Wish to Share 
58. How easy or challenging do you expect that 
it will be to repay these loans? 
-Very Challenging 
-Challenging 




59. Why do you think it will be easy or very easy 
to repay these student loans? (Check all that 
apply.) (If applicable) 
-I have a reasonable interest rate on my loans. 
-I did not take out very much in loans. 
-I will have good job prospects as an LLLT. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
60. Why do you think it will be challenging or 
very challenging to repay these student loans? 
(Check all that apply.) (If applicable) 
-The interest rates on my loans are high. 
-I had to take out a lot in loans. 
-I am not sure if I will be able to find enough 
work as an LLLT. 
-Other – Please Explain [Open Text] 
61. What is your sex? -Male 
-Female 
-Other – Please specify (if you wish to 
identify) [Open Text] 
62. What is the highest level of education you 
completed before deciding to become an LLLT? 







63. What is your race/ethnicity? (Check all that 
apply.) 
-Hispanic or Latino 
-White or Caucasian 





-Other – Please specify (if you wish to 
identify) [Open Text] 
64. Please tell us anything else you think we 
should know about becoming an LLLT or about 
this survey. 
[Open Text] 
 
 
